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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL P. PIERSON,

Case No. 990617-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah had jurisdiction in this matter in case No.
990617-SC pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1999), and §78-22(3) (i), Utah Code Ann. (1997), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action
may take an appeal to the Supreme Court involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony. Appellant was convicted in Count I of Murder, a first-degree felony in
violation of §76-5-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997), plus firearm enhancement, in Count II
of Aggravated Burglary, a first-degree felony in violation of §76-6-203, Utah Code Ann.
(1997), plus firearm enhancement, and in Count III of Aggravated Kidnaping, a firstdegree felony in violation of §76-5-302, Utah Code Ann. (1997), plus firearm
enhancement.
On September 27, 1999, jurisdiction was conferred upon this Court pursuant to
§§78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3 (3) Q\ Utah Code Ann. (1998), when the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the court err in denying Mr. Pierson's Motion to dismiss Count II,
Aggravated Burglary? U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; §§76-1-402(3),
76-6-203(1 )(a), (b), Utah Code Ann. (1997); State v. Shaffer. 725 P. 2d 1301, 1313
(Utah 1986).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Denial of a Motion to dismiss an included offense is
a conclusion of law and fact. Conclusions of law are reviewed for "correctness". State
v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). Conclusions of fact are reviewed under a
"clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 87-88 (Utah 1993).
Denial of a Motion to dismiss an offense for insufficiency of the evidence is
reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah
1998). In reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court views the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. State v.
Wood. 868 P.2d at 87-88.
2. Did the court err in denying Mr. Pierson's Motion to dismiss Count III,
Aggravated Kidnaping? U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; §§ 76-1402(3), 76-5-302(1 )(b), 76-6-203(1 )(a), (b), Utah Code Ann. (1997); State v. Finlavson.
956 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v. Finlavson. No. 980279 (Utah January
14, 2000).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Denial of a Motion to dismiss an included offense is
a conclusion of law and fact. Conclusions of law are reviewed for "correctness." State
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). Conclusions of fact are reviewed under a
"clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Wood. 868 P2.d at 87-88.
Denial of a Motion to dismiss an offense for insufficiency of the evidence is
reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Galli. 967 P2d 930, 933 (Utah
1998). In reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court views the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. State v.
Wood. 868 P2d at 87-88.
3. Did the court err by failing to instruct the jury with the law barring conviction
for included and merged offenses? U.S. Const, amends. V, VI; Utah Const, art. I § 12;
§ 76-1-402(3), Utah Code Ann. (1998); State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah
1998).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether to give a jury instruction is a conclusion of
law that is reviewed for "correctness". State v. Parra. 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah App.
1998).
4. Did the court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. Pierson to serve maximum
consecutive sentences? U.S. Const, amends. V, VIII; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 9, 12: § 763-401, Utah Code Ann. (1998); State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial of court abuses its discretion if it fails to
consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive. State
v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990).
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PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
The first issue on appeal, relating to Mr. Pierson's Motion to dismiss Count II,
Aggravated Burglary, is preserved in the record ("R") at 123-31, 372-84,461 [25-26],
and 469 [64-66].
The second issue on appeal, relating to Mr. Pierson's Motion to dismiss Count III,
Aggravated Kidnaping, is preserved in the record at 123-31, 372-84, 461 [25-26], and
469 [64-66].
The third issue on appeal, relating to the failure of the court to instruct the jury
with § 76-1-402(3), Utah Code Ann. (1997), and the doctrine of merger is reviewable for
the first time on appeal in order to avoid a manifest injustice. Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure (1998); State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998). A
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewable for the first time on appeal
because Mr. Pierson is represented by new counsel and the trial court record is adequate
to permit decision of the issues. State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37,40 (Utah 1996).
The fourth issue on appeal, relating to the maximum consecutive sentencing of
Mr. Pierson, is preserved in the record at 373 and 461 [23-25].
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rules and statutes will be determinative of the issues on appeal:
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1999)
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence (1999)
§ 76-1-401, Utah Code Ann. (1998)
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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§ 76-1-402, Utah Code Ann. (1997)
§ 76-3-201, Utah Code Ann. (1998)
§ 76-3-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997)
§ 76-3-401, Utah Code Ann. (1998)
§ 76-5-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997)
§ 76-5-302, Utah Code Ann. (1997)
§ 76-6-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997)
The text of these rules and statutes is contained in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 22, 1998, Mr. Pierson, with codefendants Clint R. Hartley and Jeffery
R. Burgener, was charged by Second Amended Information in Third District Court case
No. 97100413FS. R: 18-22. Count I charged Criminal Homicide, Murder, a first-degree
felony in violation of § 76-5-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997), Count II charged Aggravated
Burglary, a first-degree felony in violation of § 76-6-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997), and
Count IV charged Aggravated Kidnaping, a first-degree felony in violation of § 76-5302, Utah Code Ann. (1997). Count III charged Clint R. Hartley alone with Aggravated
Kidnaping. All Counts were enhanced under § 76-3-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997)
("firearm enhancement"), and under § 76-3-203.1, Utah Code Ann. (1997) ("gang
enhancement"). Following the preliminary hearing, trial counsel moved the court to
dismiss Count II, Aggravated Burglary, and Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping. R: 12331. The court denied the Motion on March 9, 1998, and ordered Mr. Pierson and the
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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codefendants bound over on all counts. R: 458[34].
On August 17, 1998, the court ordered that Mr. Pierson be tried separately. R:
462[4]. Ajury trial began on August 25, 1998. R: 463. During the trial, codefendants
Clint R. Hartely and Melisa Parker testified against Mr. Pierson as State witnesses. R:
467[112-224]; 468[231-376]. After the State rested, trial counsel again moved to
dismiss Counts II and III. The court took the Motions under advisement. R: 469[62-64].
Trial counsel failed to move the court to instruct the jury according to § 76-1-402(3),
Utah Code Ann. (1997), that prohibits conviction of an offense that is included in a
charged offense. Trial counsel also failed to request an Instruction based on the doctrine
of merger that prohibits conviction for an offense that is merely incidental to a charged
offense. The instructions provided to the jury appear in the Record at 295-343. The text
of the Instructions is contained in Addendum C. On August 28, 1998, the jury convicted
Mr. Pierson as charged on all three Counts. R: 466[212-13].
At the sentencing hearing on June 18, 1999, trial counsel again moved the court to
dismiss Count II, Aggravated Burglary, and Count III, Aggravated Kidnapping. R: 37284. Trial counsel also moved the court to sentence Mr. Pierson concurrently. The court
did not grant the Motion to dismiss Counts II and III. The court sentenced Mr. Pierson
consecutively on all Counts, also ordering the maximum term of incarceration for
Aggravated Kidnapping, fifteen years to life. R: 461 [45-46]. The court also imposed
consecutive maximum enhancements on each Count under § 76-3-203, Utah Code Ann.
(1997) ("firearm enhancement"). R: 461 [46]. The court did not impose enhancements
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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under § 76-3-203.1, Utah Code Ann. (1997) ("gang enhancement"). R: 461 [42-43]. The
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment Order appears in the Record at 413-14; See also
Addendum A.
Mr. Pierson appeals from the final judgment, challenging the denial of his
Motions to dismiss Counts II and III. Also, Mr. Pierson argues on appeal that the court
erred by failing to instruct the jury with the law barring conviction for included and
merged offenses. Finally, Mr. Pierson argues on appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion by sentencing him to consecutive maximum terms of incarceration.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Testimony and evidence was presented at trial to support the following factual
allegations. Codefendant Clint R. Hartley testified that on January 27, 1997, he, Michael
Pierson and Jeffery R. Burgener met at Hartley's house. Pierson asked Hartley to
participate in a plan to steal marijuana from a house at 6543 W. 3880 South. R: 468[23537]. Hartley agreed. Pierson described the floor plan of the house to Hartley and
Burgener. Pierson told Hartley to enter the house, go upstairs and bring any person there
downstairs. Pierson told Burgener to detain people on the floor in the living room.
Pierson told them that Melisa Parker would knock on the door and ask for a fake name so
the residents would open the door. When the door was opened, they would enter the
house to look for the marijuana. R: 468[238]. Pierson said he would go to the basement,
make sure nobody was there, and get the marijuana. R: 468[239]. Pierson said that the
residents would give them what they wanted without fighting back. R: 468[248].
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Pierson said that if a person named Billy Charles was there and tried to fight back, he
would shoot him. Otherwise, they took the guns only to scare the residents and control
the situation. R: 468[249].
Burgener drove Pierson and Hartley in his car and picked up Melisa Parker at her
house. R: 468[241]. Then they drove to Pierson's house. Pierson went inside and
returned to the car with a white scarf he gave to Hartley to use as a mask, a red bandana
he used as a mask, a nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun, and a pair of socks that
Pierson used as gloves. R: 468[243]. Then they drove to Burgener's house. Burgener
went inside and returned to the car with white gloves and a .45 caliber revolver handgun
he gave to Hartley, and brown gloves and a nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun he
kept for himself. R: 468[245].
Then they drove to the house in West Valley, with Pierson giving directions. R:
468[246]. Burgener parked the car about two blocks away, and they walked to the
house. They entered the driveway and went to the back yard where they put on masks.
Burgener and Pierson looked through a window. The lights were on and they could hear
female voices. R: 468[247]. Pierson, Hartley and Burgener had masks on and guns out.
Parker had neither a mask nor a gun. R: 468[250]. Parker knocked on the side door and
Pierson, Hartley and Burgener lined up at the sides of the door so as not to be seen when
the door opened. R: 468[251-54]. When the door opened, Pierson and Hartley rushed
through the door, with Hartley two feet behind and to the right of Pierson. R: 468[257].
Pierson fired his gun once into the house. Then Hartley fired once into the house. R:
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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468[258]. Donald Dobson was shot by Hartley. R: 340; 469[68]. The shooting of
Dobson was not intentional. R: 326; 468[249].
Jared Bowers testified that on January 27, 1997, he, Elaina Hoggard, Casey
Peterson, Neyna Davis and Donald Dobson were at the house at 6543 W. 3880 South in
West Valley City. R: 463[115-17]. At about 7:30 p.m. he heard a knock on the side
door of the house R: 463 [124]. He opened the door and saw a female whom he
described as eighteen years old, five feet tall, blond hair and wearing Levis and a white
sweater. R: 463 [126-27]. The female asked for a person named Nick. Before Bowers
responded, a man appeared outside the doorway and pointed a pistol at his head. R:
463[127-28]. The pistol was a semiautomatic design. R:463[129]. The gunman was
wearing a black ball cap, a red bandana, black pants, black longsleeved shirt with a red
and white jersey over it, and Bowers could not see his face or recognize him. R:
463[130; 133]. Bowers grabbed the gunman's gun hand and pushed it away, and the gun
discharged. R: 461 [131]. Bowers fell back, pushed the gunman away and then heard
another shot. R: 463[132]. Bowers then ran out the door to a neighbor's house. R:
463[136]. Bowers observed two other males in the carport as he ran away, both wearing
bandanas over their faces. R: 463[135].
Elaina Hoggard testified that she, Jared Bowers, Neyna Davis, Don Dobson and
Casey Peterson were present in the house a 6543 W. 3880 South on the evening of
January 27, 1997. R: 463 [177-79]. She was sitting on the couch in the living room
when she heard a knock on the side door. Peterson was upstairs in his bedroom and
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Davis was sitting on the couch. Bowers answered the door, and she heard a girl's voice.
R: 463[180-81]. A male pushed his way through the door holding an automatic gun. She
did not recognize the man because a bandana was covering his face. R: 463 [184]. The
man was yelling to get down and was asking questions like "where is the shit." Bowers
lifted up his hands and the man fired twice. Hoggard then turned and ran downstairs to
the basement and entered the room on the left. R: 463[185]. From there Hoggard heard
the footsteps of someone running upstairs from the living room and someone else
running downstairs from the livingroom. R: 463 [187].
Hoggard testified that another male entered the basement room, put an automatic
design gun in her face, and told her to get down on the ground. R: 463[188]. The lights
were off downstairs. R: 463 [186]. The male repeatedly asked "where is the shit?"
Hoggard remained there with the male no longer than five minutes. Then the first male
Hoggard saw come through the door came downstairs with Neyna Davis in front of him.
R: 463[191-92]. They entered the other downstairs bedroom and the male said "turn on
the lights...don't open the door...don't even think about it...where is it at?". R: 463[193].
The male with Hoggard then ran out of the room and went upstairs. The other male
brought Davis into the room, after less than a minute in the other bedroom, and told her
to get on the ground with Hoggard. R: 463 [194]. Both males had automatic design
guns. After about a minute, a third male in a checkered shirt entered the room and
kicked over a table, saying "where is it?". R: 463 [195-96]. Then the male ran upstairs.
Hoggard also testified that the males may have been downstairs only one at a time and
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alone each time. R: 464[22].
Neyna Davis testified that she, Elaina Hoggard, Casey Peterson, Jared Bowers and
Donald Dobson were in the house at 6443 W. 3880 South on the evening of January 27,
1997. R: 464[54-55]. She heard a knock on the side door. Bowers answered the door
and she heard a female voice. R: 464[58-59]. Bowers said "he's not here" and started to
close the door when a male came in the door wearing a black and red checkered shirt, a
red bandana on his face and a black hat. R: 464[60]. Davis saw two shots fired, then
turned and saw Dobson lying on his back. R: 464[61-63]. Davis stood by Dobson and a
different male put a gun to her head and told her to get down. R: 464[66-67]. The male
was wearing a black and white jersey with a windbreaker, black pants, black beanie and a
black rag around his mouth. R: 464[67]. The second male asked Davis "where the weed
was". A girl entered the house and spoke with the male. Davis later identified her as
Melisa Parker. R: 464[68-69]. The male directed Davis downstairs at gunpoint. They
entered Jared's room downstairs and saw a rifle in the closet. The male said "don't think
about touching that." R: 464[72-73]. They left that room after "a split second", then
entered the room where Hoggard was with another male, not the one who entered the
door first and fired the shot. R: 464[77-78]. They were in this room for maybe less than
a minute. Davis then opened another storage room where marijuana might be, and then
the male with Davis ran upstairs and left. R: 464[78-79]. The male Davis saw with
Hoggard in the other room had already left. Davis saw Hoggard crouched on the floor by
herself. R: 464[79-80].
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Count II of the Information,
Aggravated Burglary, pursuant to the provisions of § 76-l-402(3)(a), Utah Code Ann.
(1998), because Aggravated Burglary was proven in the present case by less than all the
facts required to establish the commission of "felony murder" of which Mr. Pierson was
convicted in Count I. U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; State v. Hill 674
P.2d 96 (Utah 1993).
Second, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Count III of the Information,
Aggravated Kidnaping, pursuant to the provisions of § 76-l-402(3)(a), because the facts
proven at trial show that the detention was merely incidental to the commission of
Aggravated Burglary. State v. Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283, 290 (Utah App. 1998). Further,
under the doctrine of "merger", the evidence in the present case cannot support
conviction of Aggravated Kidnaping even if it does not constitute a lesser included
offense under § 76-3-402(3)(a) because the detention is incidental to the burglary. State
v. Finlavson, No. 980279, slip. op. at 9 (Utah January 14, 2000). U.S. Const, amend. V;
Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
Third, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that a defendant may not
be convicted of an offense included in another charged offense under § 76-3-402(3).
Similarly, the trial Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a defendant may not be
convicted of an offense that "merges" into another charged offense. The trial court erred
in giving Instruction No. 23 because it contradicts § 76-3-402(3) and the doctrine of
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

merger. These errors create manifest injustice at trial. See Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure (1998); State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998).
Further, trial counsel was ineffective by failing to try to cure these errors. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
Fourth, the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing maximum
consecutive sentences. U.S. Const, amends. V, VIII; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 9, 12; State v.
Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). The court failed to consider legally relevant
factors in mitigation, relied on aggravating circumstances based on erroneous factual
findings and failed to make necessary factual findings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS COUNT II,
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY.
The "double jeopardy" clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that no "person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides that no
"person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Section 76-1-402(3), Utah Code
Ann. (1998), is founded on these constitutional guarantees:
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode - Included
offenses.

(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
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(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.

In State v. Hill 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court of Utah adopted
a two-part test to determine whether a greater-lesser relationship exists between two
offenses:
We conclude that for purposes of the prohibition against conviction "of both
the offense charged and the included offense," § 76-1-402(3), the greater-lesser
relationship must be determined by comparing the statutory elements of the two
crimes as a theoretical matter and, where necessary, by reference to the facts
proved at trial

The secondary test is required by the circumstance that some crimes have
multiple variations, so that a greater-lesser relationship exists between some
variations of these crimes, but not between others... A theoretical comparison of
the statutory elements of two crimes having multiple variations will be
insufficient. In order to determine whether a defendant can be convicted and
punished for two different crimes committed in connection with a single criminal
episode, the court must consider the evidence to determine whether the greaterlesser relationship exists between the specific variations of the crimes actually
proved at trial
(Citations omitted). See also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)
("where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one.
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not"). According
to Hill therefore, we compare the statutory elements of the crimes charged in the present
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case.
The jury was instructed by Instruction No. 24 that the following statutory elements
must be proven to find Mr. Pierson guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder, in Count I:
1. That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah;
2. The defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, as a party to the offense;
3. Was engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate
flight from the commission or attempted commission of aggravated burglary; and
4. Unlawfully caused the death of Donald Dobson.
R: 325; See also Instruction No. 1 (R: 295). The jury was instructed by Instruction No.
27 that the following statutory elements must be proven to find Mr. Pierson guilty of
Aggravated Burglary in Count II:
1. That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, entered or remained in the
building of Jared Bowers; and
2. That the defendant entered or remained unlawfully; and
3. That the defendant entered or remained intentionally or knowingly; and
4. That the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit a
theft; and
5. That in attempting, committing or fleeing from a burglary, the defendant
or another participant in the crime either:
(a) caused bodily injury to any person who was not a participant in
the crime; or
(b) used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon
against any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) possessed or attempted to use any explosive or dangerous
weapon.
R: 328 (emphasis added).1
1. The jury was instructed as follows in Instruction No. 1:
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, at 6543 West 3880
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about January 27, 1997, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
-15-
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A. Aggravated Burglary Is An Included Offense Of Murder.
As charged in the present case, Aggravated Burglary is an included offense of
Murder according to the provisions of § 76-1-402(3)(a) because no additional facts or
separate elements are required to prove Aggravated Burglary after "felony murder" is
proven based on the commission of Aggravated Burglary. In State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d
1301, 1313 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court of Utah relied on the analysis set forth in
Hill and held:
Under the facts of this case, therefore, proof of aggravated robbery was a
necessary element to proof of first degree felony murder. There can be no doubt
that, standing alone, the crimes of aggravated robbery and first degree murder are
separate offenses. The offenses are found in different sections of the code. First
degree murder is an offense against the person, whereas aggravated robbery is an
offense against property. However, under the test for separateness found in
section 76-1-402(3), aggravated robbery becomes a lesser included offense of first
degree felony murder where, in the situation such as the case at bar, the predicate
felony for first degree murder is aggravated robbery. No additional facts or
separate elements are required to prove aggravated robbery after first degree
murder based on the predicate offense of aggravated robbery is shown. Thus, first
degree murder based on the predicate offense of aggravated robbery stands in a
greater relationship to the lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. If the

FN. 1 (CONTINUED)
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL PAUL PIERSON, a party to the
offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Donald Dobson with
the intent to commit a felony, and caused bodily injury to Donald Dobson and / or
entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Donald Dobson with the intent
to commit a felony, and used a dangerous weapon, to wit: handgun, against
Donald Dobson.
R: 296 (emphasis added). Instruction No. 27 alleges "in the building of Jared Bowers",
but Instruction No. 1 alleges "in the dwelling of Donald Dobson." The Second Amended
Information also alleges "in the dwelling of Donald Dobson" in Count II, Aggravated
Burglary. R: 19. Instruction No. 27 is clearly erroneous in this respect.
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greater crime is proven, then the lesser crime merges into it. Consequently,
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-1-402(3) prevents the defendant from being convicted and
sentenced for aggravated robbery in addition to first degree murder where the
aggravating circumstance is aggravated robbery.
This analysis should be controlling in the present case.
The State argued below that Aggravated Burglary is not a lesser included offense
of felony murder, relying on the analysis set forth in State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234
(Utah 1990). In 1988 Charles McCovey was charged with capital first degree murder
under § 76-5-202(I)(d), Utah Code Ann. (1988), and with Aggravated Robbery after he
shot and killed a customer during the robbery of a store. The jury convicted McCovey of
second degree murder under § 76-5-203(I)(d), Utah Code Ann. (1988) ("felony
murder"), and Aggravated Robbery.
The McCovey court held that Aggravated Robbery was not a lesser included
offense on the facts of that case. The court applied the Hill test and then distinguished
the holding in Shaffer as follows:
Despite the fact that there are many functional similarities between the first
degree murder aggravating factors and the second degree felony murder
enhancements, there are some stark differences between the Shaffer case and the
present case. First, in Shaffer, the victim of the robbery and the victim of the
murder were the same person. In the present case, the video store was robbed, and
a customer was killed. This distinction sets out in base relief the distinct
differences in the nature of aggravated robbery and felony murder because there
are two separate victims.
Second,... It would appear that the Utah State Legislature did not intend
the multiple crimes of felony murder to be punished as a single crime, but rather,
that the homicide be enhanced to second degree felony murder in addition to the
underlying felony. To conclude otherwise would be to defeat the deterrent
purpose of the felony murder statute and result in unjust consequences.
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McCovev. 803 P.2d at 1238-39. McCovev is factually distinguished from the present
case and it was wrongly decided.
In the present case, the victim of the Aggravated Burglary and the victim of the
murder is the same person. Donald Dobson, the murder victim, lived in the burglarized
home. R: 463 [115-17]. The State alleged in the Second Amended Information that
Dobson was shot in his dwelling during a burglary. R: 19. The jury was instructed that
Mr. Pierson was charged with burglarizing the dwelling of Dobson. R: 296. Further,
unlike McCovev. Mr. Pierson did not shoot Dobson. Hartley did. R: 340; 469[68]. Mr.
Pierson was charged as a party to the homicide because he was alleged to have
participated in the Aggravated Burglary with Hartley. See Instruction No. 25. R: 326.
Second, the McCovev court improperly resorted to legislative intent in order to
override the plain language in § 76-l-402(3)(a). McCovev, 803 P.2d at 1239-40
(Durham, J., dissenting; Zimmerman, J., dissenting). Justice Durham wrote in dissent:
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion overrides the plain language in
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a). This court has previously stated, "Where
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond to
divine legislative intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a statute should be
construed according to its plain language." Allisen v. American Legion Post No.
134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). The plain language of section 76-1402(3)(a) indicates that if an offense "is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged" the
defendant may not be convicted of both the offense and an offense so included. It
is not possible to convict a defendant of killing while commiting an aggravated
robbery without proving the facts of the felony of aggravated robbery. The
United States Supreme Court reached a similar result in Whalen v. United States,
445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). "A conviction for killing
in the course of a rape cannot be had without proving all the elements of the
offense of rape." Whalen. 445 U.S. at 693-94, 100 S.Ct. At 1438-39.
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Id. at 1239.
Third, Aggravated Burglary is an enhancing factor in felony murder under §76-5203(I)(d) (1997), in the present case. As such, it is functionally equivalent to the facts in
Shaffer, where Aggravated Robbery served as an enhancing factor in first degree murder
under § 76-5-203)(l)(d) (1988). McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1238. And, the present case is
clearly factually distinguished from McCovey. In the present case, unlike McCovey, Mr.
Pierson is convicted for murder, for a shooting that he did not commit (R: 340; 469[68])
because it occurred during an Aggravated Burglary that constitutes a necessary element
of felony Murder. Also, unlike McCovey, the victim of the homicide is also the victim of
the burglary in the present case. Viewing Aggravated Burglary as an included offense,
therefore, does not result in "a two-for-one windfall" for Mr. Pierson. Id. at 1239.
For these reasons the Court should vacate Mr. Pierson's conviction of Aggravated
Burglary in Count II pursuant to the provisions of § 76-l-402(3)(a), Utah Code Ann.
(1998); Shaffer, 775 P.2d at 1314.

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS COUNT III.
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING.
To determine whether Aggravated Kidnaping is an included offense of
Aggravated Burglary, we compare the statutory elements of the crimes charged in the
present case. Hill 674 P.2d at 97. The jury was instructed by Instruction No. 27 that the
following statutory elements must be proven for Aggravated Burglary in Count II:
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1. That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, entered or remained in the
building of Jared Bowers: and
2. That the defendant entered or remained unlawfully; and
3. That the defendant entered or remained intentionally or knowingly; and
4. That the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit a
theft; and
5. That in attempting, committing or fleeing from a burglary, the defendant
or another participant in the crime either:
(a) caused bodily injury to any person who was not a participant in
the crime; or
(b) used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon
against any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) possessed or attempted to use any explosive or dangerous
weapon.
R: 328 (emphasis added).2 The jury was instructed by Instruction No. 32 that the
following statutory elements must be proven for Aggravated Kidnaping in Count III:
1. That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, did by any means and in any
manner, seize, confine, detain, or transport Neyna Davis; and
2. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation was done
intentionally or knowingly; and
3. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation was against
the will of Neyna Davis, and without authority of law; and
4. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation was
committed with the intent to hold Neyna Davis as a shield or for ransom or
reward; or to hold Neyna Davis as a shield or hostage; or to facilitate the
commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted
commission of a felony; or to inflict bodily injury to Neyna Davis.
R: 334. See also Instructions Nos. 1 (R: 296), and 33 (R: 336).

A. Aggravated Kidnaping Is An Included Offense Of Aggravated Burglary.

2. See supra Footnote 1.
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Examination of these statutory elements suggests that a greater-lesser relationship
does not necessarily exist as a theoretical matter. Therefore, it is necessary to consider
the evidence to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship exists between the
specific variations of Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping proven at trial.
Hill. 674 P.2d at 97.
The jury was instructed to multiple variations of Aggravated Kidnaping, even
though the evidence at trial supported only a detention with the commission of a felony,
Aggravated Burglary. See § 76-5-302(1 )(b)(ii), Utah Code Ann. (1998). The evidence
of Aggravated Kidnaping consisted of the following: (1) A single male took Neyna
Davis from the livingroom to two rooms in the basement of the same house (R: 464[6679]; 468[262]); (2) The detention lasted several minutes (R: 464[78-79]; 468[262]; (3)
Clint Hartley testified that he took the girl to the basement (R: 468[261]); (4) Melisa
Parker testified that Mr. Pierson took the girl downstairs (R: 467[ 143-44]); and (5) The
purpose of the detention was to find the marijuana (R: 464[72]; 468[261]).
The evidence of Aggravated Burglary consisted of the following: (1) The
defendants entered or remained unlawfully in the house (R: 468[257]); (2) With the
intent to steal marijuana (R: 468[238]); and (3) While doing so Donald Dobson was shot
by Hartley (R: 340; 469[68]) and (4) Neyna Davis, and others, was threatened with a gun
(R:464[71]).
This evidence shows that the Aggravated Kidnaping and the Aggravated Burglary
occurred simultaneously. Thus, the elements of Aggravated Kidnaping were established
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by the same or less facts establishing the Aggravated Burglary. In State v. Finlayson,
956 P.2d 283, 289 (Utah App. 1998), the Court of Appeals of Utah adopted a three-part
test to determine whether a detention or movement of a victim is significantly
independent of another crime to justify a separate conviction for Kidnaping consistent
with the provisions of § 76-l-402(3)(a):
[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the
commission of another crime, to be kidnaping the resulting movement or
confinement:
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other
crime;
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it
makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially
lessons the risk of detection.

A standstill robbery on the street is not a kidnaping; the forced removal of the
victim to a dark alley for robbery is. The removal of a rape victim from room to
room within a dwelling solely for the convenience and comfort of the rapist is not
a kidnaping; the removal from a public place to a place of seclusion is. The
forced direction of a store clerk to cross the store to open a cash register is not a
kidnaping; locking him in a cooler to facilitate escape is.
(Citations omitted) (emphasis added). Applying this test, the detention of Davis was
brief, lasting perhaps two to three minutes. The movement to another room in the same
house is inconsequential. Davis lived in the house being burglarized. R: 463 [117].
Aggravated Burglary, as instructed, requires the use of a dangerous weapon against a
person, and a detention is therefore inherent to the burglary charge. Also, the detention
did not have any significance independent of the burglary because it neither made the
burglary substantially easier to commit, nor substantially lessened the risk of detection
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because the purpose of the detention was to accomplish the burglary by finding the
marijuana. R: 468[237]. In Finlayson, the Court held that a separate conviction of
Aggravated Kidnaping was not supported by the evidence where the defendant
handcuffed the victim, carried her into another room in the same house against her will,
and then raped her. This reasoning is controlling in the present case.
For these reasons the Court should vacate Mr. Pierson's conviction of Aggravated
Kidnaping in Count III because it is an included offense of Aggravated Burglary
pursuant to the provisions of § 76-l-402(3)(a), Utah Code Ann. (1998); Finlayson, 956
P.2d at 290.

B. Aggravated Kidnaping Merges Into Aggravated Burglary.
Recently the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the decision in Finlayson, but on
different grounds. State v. Finlayson, No. 980279 (Utah January 14, 2000) ("Finlayson
IT). The opinion remains subject to revision before final publication. Finlayson II held
that Aggravated Kidnaping did not constitute an included offense of Rape and Sodomy
according to § 76-l-402(3)(a) because Rape and Sodomy do not require proof of
detention, an essential element of Aggravated Kidnaping, although detention is
inherently an aspect of both crimes. Id., slip op at 5. The court reasoned that §76-1402(3)(a) does not govern because, in the language of the statute, Aggravated Kidnaping
is not "established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense" of Rape and Sodomy. Id. Finlayson II further held,
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however, that the conviction of Aggravated Kidnaping must be vacated because the
detention was slight, inconsequential, merely incidental to the other crimes and had no
independent significance. Id., slip. op. at 9.
The reasoning in Finlayson II applies in the present case and requires that the
conviction of Aggravated Kidnaping be vacated. Finlayson II adopted the same threepart analysis relied on by the Court of Appeals in analyzing the Aggravated Kidnaping
charge:
[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the
commission of another crime, to be kidnaping the resulting movement or
confinement:
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the
other crime;
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime;
and
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in
that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or
substantially lessons the risk of detection.
Id., slip. op. at 8 (citing State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 731 (Kan. 1976)); see also State
v. Finlayson. 956 P.2d 283, 289 (Utah App. 1998). As already discussed, supra at H.A.,
the detention of Davis was brief, lasting perhaps two to three minutes. The movement to
another room in the same house is inconsequential. Davis lived in the house being
burglarized. R: 463 [117]. Aggravated Burglary, as instructed, requires the use of a
dangerous weapon against a person, and a detention is therefore inherent to the burglary.
Also, the detention did not have any significance independent of the burglary because it
neither made the burglary substantially easier to commit, nor substantially lessened the
risk of detection because the purpose of the detention was to accomplish the burglary by
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finding the marijuana. R: 468[238]. For these reasons the Court should vacated Mr.
Pierson's conviction of Aggravated Kidnaping in Count III based on the doctrine of
merger.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY WITH
THE LAW BARRING CONVICTION FOR INCLUDED AND MERGED OFFENSES.
Section 76-1-402(3), provides in part that a "defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense." In the present case, Mr. Pierson was convicted on all
Counts, although Count II, Aggravated Burglary, is an included offense of Count I,
Murder, and Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping is an included offense of Count II,
Aggravated Burglary (or, merges into Count II) and, a fortiori, of Count I as well. The
trial court failed to instruct the jury according to § 76-1-402(3), and failed to instruct the
jury according to the doctrine of merger,3 and trial counsel failed to request that these
Instructions be given.

3. As discussed, supra at II.B., Finlayson II, No. 980279, slip. op. at 8, held that an
accused cannot be convicted both for a charged offense and for another offense that
merges into it, even where § 76-l-402(3)(a) does not technically apply. A jury
Instruction should have been given similar to the following based on the doctrine of
merger. (See Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1998)):
Mr. Pierson is charged with Criminal Homicide, Murder in Count I, with
Aggravated Burglary in Count II, and with Aggravated Kidnaping in Count III. If
a movement or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the
commission of another crime, you cannot convict Mr. Pierson of the offense of
Aggravated Kidnaping unless you find the following to be true beyond a
reasonable doubt:
-25-
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Further, the court instructed the jury with Instruction No. 23 which provides:
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the information.
Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately.
The fact that you may find the accused guilty or not as to one of the offenses
charged should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged.
R: 324. Instruction No. 23 is an incorrect statement of law in view of the provisions of §
76-1-402(3), the doctrine of merger and the greater-lesser relationships of Counts I, II
and III. Trial counsel failed to object to Instruction No. 23.

A. The Jury Instructions Create Manifest Injustice.
Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1998), provides as follows:
Rule 19. Instructions
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a
party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a
manifest injustice.

FN. 3 (Continued)
(a) The movement or confinement was not slight, inconsequential
and merely incidental to the other crime;
(b) The movement or confinement was not of the kind inherent in
the nature of the other crime; and
(c) The movement or confinement had some significance
independent of the other crime in that it made the other crime substantially
easier of commission or it substantially lessened the risk of detection.
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Because trial counsel failed to object to Instruction No. 23, and also failed to request
Instructions based on § 76-1-402(3) and the doctrine of merger, error may be assigned to
the Instructions only on a showing of manifest injustice. Utah courts have adopted a
two-part test to determine whether manifest injustice exists. First, the error must be
obvious. Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial
rights of a party. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998). This is the same
standard that is applied to determine whether plain error exists under Rule 103(d), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1998). Id. Error is considered to be of sufficient magnitude that it
affects the substantial rights of a party where there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the accused in the absence of the error. State v. Labruiru 881 P.2d
900, 903 (Utah App. 1994).
First, in the present case, the error in failing to instruct the jury according to § 761-402(3) and the doctrine of merger should have been obvious to the trial court. Trial
counsel repeatedly argued to the court — not in the presence of the jury — that Mr.
Pierson could not be convicted of Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping
because they were included and merged offenses. R: 123-31; 372-84; 461 [25-26]; and
469[64-66]. Because the jury's function is to convict or not, it is essential that it be
instructed that it cannot convict according to § 76-1-402(3) and the doctrine of merger if
the evidence demonstrates the requisite relationships among charges. The error of
Instruction No. 23 should have been obvious as well because it directly contradicts the
provisions of § 76-1-402(3) and the doctrine of merger by instructing that "The fact that
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you may find the accused guilty or not as to one of the offenses charged should not
control your verdict as to any other offense charged."
Second, these errors affected the substantial rights of Mr. Pierson because there is
a reasonable likelihood that the jury would not have convicted him of Aggravated
Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping because the evidence at trial supports the argument
that Counts II and III are merged offenses or included offenses according to § 76-1402(3)(a).
For these reasons this Court should vacate the convictions under Count II,
Aggravated Burglary, and Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d
1059, 1061 (Utah 1991).

B. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective.
Trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to request jury instructions according
to § 76-1-402(3)(a) and the doctrine of merger, and when he failed to object to
Instruction No. 23. Utah courts have adopted a two-part test to evaluate claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a defendant must show that his counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 688. Second, defendant must demonstrate that but for the
specifically identified acts or omissions of counsel, there would exist a reasonable
probability ofa more favorable result. Id. at 694; State v. Saunders. 893 P.2d 584. 591
(Utah App. 1995). A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine
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confidence in the outcome. Id.
In the present case, the failure of trial counsel to request jury instructions
according to § 76-1 -402(3)(a) and the doctrine of merger, and his failure to object to
Instruction No. 23 falls below an objective standard of competence. First, no
explanation or tactical reason exists for such a decision. Therefore, the first part of the
Strickland test is satisfied. See State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990).
Second, where jury instructions create manifest injustice or plain error, the first part of
the Strickland test is satisfied where trial counsel makes no attempt to cure the error. See
State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d at 906-07.
It is also clear in the present case that the second part of the Strickland test is
satisfied. Objecting to Instruction No. 23 and requesting instructions according to § 761-402(3)(a) and the doctrine of merger would have precluded defendant's convictions of
Count II, Aggravated Burglary, and Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping. For these reasons
this Court should vacate the convictions of Count II and Count III.

IV. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPOSING MAXIMUM
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.
A sentencing court must determine whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for separate felony offenses arising out of a single criminal episode. See §§
76-1-401, 76-3-401 (1), (5), Utah Code Ann. (1998). For this determination, the court
must consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character,
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant, See § 76-3-401 (1); State v. StrunL 846 P.2d
1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). If a statute under which the defendant was convicted - i.e., §
-29-
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76-5-302, Utah Code Ann. (1998), Aggravated Kidnaping - mandates that one of three
stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of
middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
See § 76-3-20l(6)(a), Utah Code Ann. (1998). In this determination, the court may
consider the record in the case, reports submitted for sentencing, statements submitted by
the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing
hearing. See § 76-3-20l(6)(c). The court is required to consider the sentencing
guidelines adopted by the Utah Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. See § 763-201(6)(e); Appendix D, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1999). The court must
set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower
term. § 76-3-20 l-(6)(d). An abuse of discretion occurs at sentencing when the court
fails to consider all the legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is clearly
excessive. State v. McCovev, 803 P.2d at 1235.
The court sentenced Mr. Pierson as follows: on Count I, Murder, five years to life
imprisonment; on Count II, Aggravated Burglary, five years to life imprisonment; and on
Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping, fifteen years to life imprisonment. The court ordered
that each sentence be consecutive. The court also imposed a maximum consecutive
sentence enhancement of one to five years on each Count under § 76-3-203(1), Utah
Code Ann. (1998) ("gun enhancement"). R: 413-14. The court did not impose sentence
enhancements under § 76-3-20.1,'Utah Code Ann. (1998) ("gang enhancement"),
believing that it could not legally do so. R: 461 [43]. By this sentence Mr. Pierson is
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required to serve a mandatory minimum term of twenty-eight years imprisonment before
being eligible for parole. See § 76-3-40l(8)(b). The court stated that it intended to
impose the maximum possible sentence allowed by law. R: 461 [47].
The court made no written findings relating to the sentencing. The court stated as
follows:
The - the factors that I've looked at, Mr. Pierson, are the - you were the
person who planned this, you were the person who set this into motion, who made
the phone calls, who came up with this plan, who got the group together to go to
the house.
You were one of the two individuals who fired a gun at Mr. Dobson. The
fact that is may have been Mr. Hartley's bullet in no way diminishes your
culpability, because you were prepared to shoot someone if necessary and you
took a gun with you, a loaded gun with you into that home.
You were the moving force behind this. If you hadn't put this plan into
motion and called your friends together to do this, this killing wouldn't have taken
place.
I have considered that. I have also considered the fact that this was a very
violent, unprovoked, planned killing. You fully intended to kill somebody if you
had to, to achieve your unlawful objective.
You don't have the longest criminal history that I've ever seen, but you
have a troublesome one in terms of the offenses that you've had, both in juvenile
and adult court before this.
I think it is clear to everyone in this courtroom today also that this killing
has devastated an entire family and I'm speaking of Mr. Dobson's family. And and again I'm quoting what someone else said, but they'll never be the same
again, their lives will never be the same and it is because you chose to engage in
this activity that their lives will never be the same again.
And finally, I see no remorse on your part. I think you're sorry you got
caught, I don't think you're sorry for anything else, however.
I'm imposed the maximum sentence that I believe I can impose consistent
with my interpretation of State law and I think that's appropriate for your activity
in these crimes.
I will note that my recollection is that Mr. Hartley also go the maximum
penalty that could have been imposed for the offenses that were before me at that
time, and so in terms of the same kinds of thoughts, I believe that I was consistent
in your sentencing with Mr. Hartley's. It was my intent then to give him the
maximum and my recollection is that I did. I only make that comment because
-31-
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counsel asked for some parity and I think that it's there.
Those are the factors that I reviewed and Counsel, will you please tell me if
there's anything that I have overlooked.
R: 461 [46-48].
A. The Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Consider Legally Relevant Factors.
The court abused its discretion by relying on aggravating circumstances that are
implicit to the conviction offenses, by relying on aggravating circumstances that are
based on erroneous factual findings, by failing to consider Mr. Pierson's youth and
rehabilitative needs as mitigating circumstances, and by departing from the median
mandatory term of imprisonment without factual findings. In so doing the court imposed
a sentence that is clearly excessive. See State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995).
The court relied at sentencing on a Presentence Report ("PSR") and on personal
letters received on behalf of Mr. Pierson and Donald Dobson. R:453; 461 [2]. A copy
of the PSR is attached as Addendum D. The PSR listed the following Aggravated
Circumstances that may justify concurrent or consecutive sentencing: Offender presents a
serious threat of violent behavior; Victim was particularly vulnerable; Injury to person or
property loss was unusually extensive; Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or
depravity; and There were multiple charges or victims. R: 453[PSR at Form 5].
According to the sentencing guidelines it is incorrect to utilize these allegations as
Aggravated Circumstances because they are implicit in the conviction of offenses. See
PSR Form 5. There is no evidence that the victims art particularly vulnerable. See, e.g..
State v. Strunk (Victim was six-year-old neighbor girl who knew and trusted the
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defendant). The death of Donald Dobson is implicit to the conviction offense of Murder,
and therefore not an aggravating circumstance of the crime. Similarly, there is
insufficient evidence of extreme cruelty or depravity that is not merely implicit to the
conviction offenses (e.g., torture, lengthy detention, deliberate physical injury to victims).
For this reason the court abused its discretion when it relied on these circumstances to
justify consecutive sentencing, maximum sentencing under § 76-3-203(1) ("gun
enhancement") and maximum mandatory minimum sentencing under § 76-5-302(3)
(Aggravated Kidnaping).
Second, the court erroneously stated that the killing of Dobson was planned, that
Mr. Pierson "fired a gun at Mr. Dobson" and "it may have been Mr. Hartley's bullet" that
killed Dobson: R: 461 [46-47] (emphasis added). The court abused its discretion when it
relied on facts not proven to impose consecutive sentences, maximum sentences under §
76-3-203(1) and maximum mandatory minimum sentencing under § 76-5-302(3). See,
e.g., Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 1991) ("the
making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is an abuse of discretion"). There is no
evidence that the killing of Dobson was planned. R: 468 [249]. The State did not charge
the homicide as an intentional crime, and the prosecution repeatedly argued that it was
not. R: 326[41]; 463[100]; 466[160]. There is no evidence that Mr. Pierson fired a gun
at Mr. Dobson (R: 463[131]; 464[63], and the evidence is indisputable that Hartley, not
Mr. Pierson, shot Dobson. R: 340. In fact, the court failed to consider these facts as
mitigating circumstances of Mr. Pierson's alleged role in these crimes. In State v. Galll
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967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998), The Supreme Court of Utah held that the trial courts
abused their discretion when they sentenced defendant consecutively and failed to give
adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances, including that defendant did not
inflict physical injury on his victims and that the amount of money taken during the
armed robberies was relatively small. Mr. Pierson is not alleged to have taken anything
in this burglary, and there is no evidence that he injured the victims.
Third, the court abused its discretion by failing to take into account Mr. Pierson's
youth and rehabilitative needs as mitigating factors. On January 27, 1997, the date of the
offenses, Mr. Pierson was nineteen years old. R: 453[PSR at 1-2]. The court noted that
Mr. Pierson does not have an extensive prior criminal history R: 461 [47]. In State v.
Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court of Utah held that failure to
consider the sixteen-year-old defendant's age as a mitigating factor at sentencing
required remand to the trial court for resentencing. The defendant had been convicted of
capital Murder, Child Kidnaping and Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child after he
abducted a six-year-old neighbor girl, drove her to a remote location, sexually abused her
and then killed her by repeated beatings and strangulations. The defendant was
sentenced to five years to life imprisonment for Murder, fifteen years to life for Child
Kidnaping and nine years to life for Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child. All three
sentences were ordered to run consecutively. The court wrote:
By ordering Strunk's minimum sentences for child kidnapping (fifteen
years) and aggravated sexual assault of a child (nine years) to run consecutive to
each other, the trial court assured that Strunk would spend a minimum of twentyfour years in prison before being eligible for parole. While imprisonment for that
-34-
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period of time, or even longer, may prove to be necessary and appropriate, the
twenty-four-year term robs the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to parole
Strunk sooner. Section 76-3-401 requires a trial court, in determining whether to
order consecutive sentences, to consider not only the "gravity and circumstances
of the offense," but also the "rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Although
under the statute a court may impose consecutive sentences for separate offenses
committed in the course of a single criminal episode, we find that in this case the
trial court abused its discretion in failing to sufficiently consider defendant's
rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior violent
crimes.
Therefore, if on remand the trial court again imposes the longest minimum
mandatory terms for these two offenses, all three terms should be ordered to run
concurrently to afford the Board of Pardons the flexibility to adjust Strunk's
prison stay to match his progress in rehabilitation and preparation to return to
society.
Id. at 1301-02. This reasoning should apply in the present case.
The court received information from various sources that Mr. Pierson was raised
in a dysfunctional home, was abandoned at age two by his mother, suffered from
Attention Deficit Disorder as a child, received psychological counseling as a child and
dropped out of school in the ninth grade. R: 453[PSR at 13-14, 17; letters of Michael
Pierson (father), Monica D. Pierson, Delora Pierson and Paula S. Pierson]. These
circumstances clearly demonstrate extraordinary rehabilitative needs. The Galli court
recognized that consecutive sentencing is contrary to rehabilitation:
The imposition of concurrent rather than consecutive sentences better
serves Galli's rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board of Pardons and parole to
release him from prison after five years if he has shown genuine progress toward
rehabilitation. If he does not show such progress, then the Board will be able to
keep him incarcerated for a long time, including life.
967 P.2d at 938. The Strunk court ruled similarly. 846 P.2d at 1302 ("The diagnostic
report was not optimistic as to Strunk's prospect for long-term rehabilitation, but only
-35-
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time will tell what progress this youth can make toward overcoming his serious
problems."). This reasoning should apply in the present case.
Finally, the PSR recommended that Mr. Pierson receive the median term often
years to life for the convictions of Aggravated Kidnaping, and further that the
convictions of Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping be sentenced
concurrently with each other but consecutively to the conviction of Murder. R: 453 [PSR
"Agency Recommendation"]. The court is required to impose the median term of
severity - for Aggravated Kidnaping, ten years to life imprisonment - unless it sets forth
on the record facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. See §
76-3-20l(6)(a); State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Utah App. 1995). In the present
case the court relied on no facts or reasons in addition to those set forth in the PSR to
justify the upward departure from the recommended ten-year mandatory minimum term.
Further, the court made no findings specific to departure from the statutory presumption
of the term of middle severity. Failure to identify and weigh aggravating and mitigating
factors under §76-3-201 (6)(a), (d) constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Gibbons,
799P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1989).
For these reasons this Court should vacate the consecutive sentences, the
enhancements of maximum severity under § 76-3-203(1) and the maximum mandatory
minimum term under § 76-5-302(3) and remand the case to the trial court for
resentencing to concurrent terms with enhancements and mandatory minimum terms of
lesser severity.
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons this Court should vacate the conviction of Count
II, Aggravated Burglary because it constitutes an included offense of Count I, Criminal
Homicide, Murder according to § 76-1-402(3)(a). This Court should vacate the
conviction of Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping, because it constitutes a lesser offense of
Count II, Aggravated Burglary according to § 76-1-402(3)(a) and also according to the
doctrine of merger. This Court should vacate the convictions of Count II and Count III
because the jury instructions were erroneous. And finally, this Court should remand the
case for resentencing to concurrent terms of imprisonment with enhancements and
mandatory minimum terms of lesser severity.
SUBMITTED this

ft

day of February, 2000.

ROGER K. SCOWCRpFT^
Attorney for Defendant7Appellant
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 971004133 FS

MICHAEL PAUL PIERSON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

SANDRA PEULER
June 18, 1999

PRESENT
Clerk:
kathyg
Prosecutor: VINCENT MEISTER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): PATRICK L ANDERSON
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 2, 1977
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count: 11:17
CHARGES
1. MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/28/1998 Guilty Plea
2. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/28/1998 Guilty Plea
3. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING" - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/28/1998 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant'& conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate tern
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison,
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING a 1st
Page 1
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Case Mo: 971004133
Date:
Jun 18, 1999
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than fifteen years and which may be life in the Utah
State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Each sentence is to be consecutive.

GUN ENHANCEMENT:
Dated this

Consecutive 1 - 5

ifo day of

years on each Count.

Jl(Al£

19^4 .

SANDRA PEULER
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)
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ADDENDUM B
(Rules and Statutes)
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Rule 19. Instructions.
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as tne court
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the'court instruct
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions
may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of
the charge was given and what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court
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Rule 103. Rulings on evidence*
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection
or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection,
if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer ofproof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance
of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the
context within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making
of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.
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76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder
of offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the
effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses
and defendants in criminal proceedings.
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76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode — Included offenses.
( D A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal
action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a
single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision,
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses uiider a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise
orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to
separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single
court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in
the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the
offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so
included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all
the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or
form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an
offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser
included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with
respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged
and convicting him of the included offense..
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment,
or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviption for
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and fthe trier of
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that
included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be
set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.
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76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution —
Hearing — Definitions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the
defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the
criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages,
but not general damages, which a person could recover
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses
including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including the
accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured
damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental
entity for extradition or transportation and as further
defined in Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result
of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in
the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may
sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the
following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private
office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided
by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without
parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority
conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition
to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall
order that the defendant make restitution to victims
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for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in
Subsection (l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures
as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter an order of
complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8Kb) on
the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the
order to the parties.
, (iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the person in whose favor the restitution order is
entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. In addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for
payment of restitution and the victim or department
elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process,
the victim shall be entitled to recover reasonable
attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a
hen when recorded in a judgment docket and shall
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules
as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of
sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make
rules permitting the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments
credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state
under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve
pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal
activity in the county to which he has been returned,
the court may, in addition to any other sentence it
may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity
for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in Subsection
(4Xc).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by
the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution
the W.
court
having
criminal
jurisdiction
orders
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the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in Subsection
(8).
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the
court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of
the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to
enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be entitled
to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of
court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a
hen when recorded in a judgment docket and shall
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules
as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of
sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make
rules permitting the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments
credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount,
or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the
time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on
the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may
impose, the court shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the
defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one
county to another within the state at governmental
expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C
misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay
restitution of governmental transportation expenses if
any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or
on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is issued
for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to
a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated
according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is
transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is
transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is
transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection
(5)(c)(v) applies to each defendant transported regardDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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less of the number of defendants actually transported
in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated minimum terms
shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the
term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party
may submit a statement identifying circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts.
If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the
court and served on the opposing party at least four days
prior to the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances
that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the
court may consider the record in the case, the probation
officer's report, other reports, including reports received
under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant,
and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing
hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts
supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower
term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall
consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravation and
mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal
and Juvenile Justice.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child
kidnaping, rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon
a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes
substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set
forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the
defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the
defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in
state prison. This subsection takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an
offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to
which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of
an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a
conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any
person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all
relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical,
psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance
with
amethod
healing
recognized
lawBYU.
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occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8)0)) and:
(i) thefinancialresources of the defendant and the
burden that payment of restitution will impose,- with
regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution
on an installment basis or on other conditions to be
fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of
the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may
defer entering an order of restitution if the court determines that the complication' and prolongation of the
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of
restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs
the need to provide restitution to the victim.
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76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of
imprisonment — Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon used.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term
at not less than five years, unless otherwise specifically
provided by law, and which may be for life but if the trier
of fact finds a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section
76-1-601, was used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively
and not concurrently; and the court may additionally
sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a
term at not less than one year nor more than 15 years but
if the trier of fact finds a dangerous weapon, as defined in
Section 76-1-601, was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively
and not concurrently.
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term
not to exceed five years but if the trier of fact finds a
dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, was
used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the
court may additionally sentence the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to. exceed five years to rim
consecutively and not concurrently.
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon,
as defined in Section 76-1-601, was used or involved in the
accomplishment of the felony and is convicted of another
felony when a dangerous weapon was used or involved in
the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any
other sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not less than five nor more than ten years
to run consecutively and not concurrently.
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76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences —
Limitations — Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses
run consecutively if the later offense is committed while the
defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds
and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be
inappropriate.
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state
whether the sentences shall run consecutively or concurrently,
and the Board of Pardons and Parole has reason to believe
that the later offense occurred while the person was imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the
request, the court shall enter an amended order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively
or concurrently.
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of
the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative
needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose
consecutive sentences.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section
76-1-401.
(6) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate
maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years
imprisonment. However, this limitation does not apply if an
offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one
offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more
offenses, all of which were committed prior to imposition
of sentence for any one or more of them; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state
other than the present sentencing court or by a court of
another state or federal jurisdiction.
(8) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and
the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has
been committed for a single term that shall consist of the
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year
limitation, the maximum sentence is considered to be 30
years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively,
the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the
validly imposed minimum terms.
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(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to
run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently
f>eing served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the greater
and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences
are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence
with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be
served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the
niunber or length of individual consecutive sentences that
may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor
cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned* means sentenced
and committed to a secure correctional facility as defined in
Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated or
voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where
the person is located.
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76-5-203, Murdei
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the acton
(a) intentionally or knowincdv causes the death of another
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that
causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another;
(d) while in the commission, attempted commission, or
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, object rape,
forcible sodomy, or aggravated sexual assault, aggravated
arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated
kidnapping, kidnapping, child kidnapping, rape of a child,
object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, forcible sexual
abuse, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of
a child, or child abuse, as defined in Subsection 76-5109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 14 years of age,
causes the death of another person other than a party as
defined in Section 76-2-202; or
(e) recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while
in the commission or attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer as defined in
Section 76-5-102.4; or
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making
a lawful arrest as defined in Section 76-8-305 if the
actor uses force against a peace officer.
(2) Murder is a first degree felony.
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76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping.
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the person
intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law and
against the will of the victim, by any means and in any
manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim:
(a) and in committing, attempting to commit, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the
kidnaping, the actor possesses, uses, or threatens to use a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) with intent:
(i) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or
hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in
particular conduct;
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted
commission of a felony;
(iii) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the
victim or another,
(iv) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function; or
(v) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part
4 of this chapter.
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force,
threat, or deceit if the victim is mentally incompetent or
younger than 16 years and the detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the victim's custodial
parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the
victim.
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less
than 6, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406.
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76-6-203. Aggravated burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or
another participant in the crime:
(a) causes bodily iiyury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the
crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the
same definition as under Section 76-1-601.
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ADDENDUM C
(Jury Instructions)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

Plaintiff,
vs.

CRIMINAL NO. 971004133

MICHAEL PAUL PIERSON,
Defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO. 1
You are instructed that the defendant

MICHAEL PAUL PIERSON

is charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the
commission of

CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER: AGGRAVATED BURGLARY; and

AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING . The Information alleges:
COUNT I
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a First Degree Felony, at 6543 West
3880 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about January
27, 1997, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL
PAUL PIERSON, a party to the offense, while in the commission,
attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or
attempted commission of aggravated burglary, caused the death of
Donald Dobson.
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COUNT II
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, at 6543 West 3880
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about January 27,
1997, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 203, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL PAUL
PIERSON, a party to the offense, entered or remained unlawfully in
the dwelling of Donald Dobson with the intent to commit a felony,
and caused bodily injury to Donald Dobson and/or entered or
remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Donald Dobson with the
intent to commit a felony, and used a dangerous weapon, to wit:
handgun, against Donald Dobson.
COUNT III
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 6543 West
3880 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about January
27, 1997, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 302, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL
PAUL PIERSON, a party to the offense, did intentionally or
knowingly, and without authority of law, and against the will of
Neyna Davis, seize another with the intent to compel a third person
to engage in a certain act or forbear from engaging in a certain
act and/or did intentionally or knowingly, and without authority of
law, and against the will of Neyna Davis, seize another with the
intent to facilitate the commission or attempted commission of a
felony, or flight from a felony.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

<^\

It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the law
applicable to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to follow
the law as I shall state it to you.
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that are
presented by the allegations in the Information and the defendant's
plea of "not guilty." This duty you should perform uninfluenced by
pity for the defendant or by passion or prejudice against the
defendant. You must not suffer yourselves to be biased against the
defendant because of the fact that defendant has been arrested for
this offense, or because an Information has been filed against
defendant, or because defendant has been brought before the court
to stand trial.

None of these facts is evidence of defendant's

guilt, and you are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any
or all of them that defendant is more likely to be guilty than
innocent.
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in
this trial and the law as stated to you by me. The law forbids you
to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.

Both the State of

Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and expect that you
will conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the
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evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a
just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict
may be.

The verdict must express the individual opinion of each

juror.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

In determining any fact in this case you should not consider
nor be influenced by any statement or act done by the court which
you may interpret as indicating its views thereon.

You are the

sole and final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you,
and you must determine such questions for yourselves from the
evidence, without regard to what you believe the court thinks
thereon.

The court has not intended to express, or be understood

as giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, or
what are or what are not the facts in the case.
what the court thinks thereon.

It is immaterial

You must follow your own views and

not be influenced by the view of the court.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

H

You should not consider as evidence any statement of counsel
made

during

the trial, unless such statement was made as a

stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

J

If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea has been
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none
must be inferred by you.

For that reason, you are not to single

out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction,
but you are to consider the instructions as a whole, and to regard
each in the light of all the others.
The

order

in which

the

instructions

are

significance as to their relative importance.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their
deliberations are a matter of considerable importance.

It is

rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering the jury room,
to make an emphatic expression of their opinion on the case or to
announce

a determination to stand for a certain verdict.

When one

does that at the outset, their sense of pride may be aroused, and
they may hesitate to recede from an announced position even if
shown that it is fallacious.

Remember that you are not partisans

or advocates in this matter, but are judges. The final test of the
quality of your service will lie in the verdict which you return to
the court not in the opinions any of you may hold as you retire to
begin your deliberations.

Have in mind that you will make a

definite contribution to efficient judicial administration if you
arrive at a just and proper verdict.

To that end, the court would

remind you that in your deliberations in the jury room there can be
no triumph excepting the ascertainment and declaration of the truth
and the administration of justice based thereon.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
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The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled to the
individual opinion of each juror.

It is the duty of each of you

after considering all the evidence in. the case, to determine, if
possible, the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant.
When you have reached a conclusion in that respect you should not
change it merely because one or more of all of your fellow jurors
may have come to a different conclusion.

However, the jurors

should freely and fairly discuss the evidence and the deductions to
be drawn therefrom.

If, after doing so, any juror should be

satisfied that a conclusion first reached was wrong, the juror
unhesitatingly should abandon that original opinion and render the
jurorfs verdict according to the final decision.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

At times throughout the trial the court has been called upon
to determine whether certain offered evidence might properly be
received.

You are not to be concerned with the reasons for such

rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them.

Whether

offered evidence is admissible is purely a question of law.

In

admitting evidence to which an objection is made, the court does
not determine what weight should be given such evidence; nor does
it pass on the credibility of the witness. You are not to consider
evidence offered but not received, nor any evidence stricken out by
the court; as to any question to which an objection was sustained,
you must not conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as
to the reason for the objection.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

1

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In case of a reasonable doubt as
to whether defendant's guilt is satisfactorily shown, defendant is
entitled to an acquittal.
The burden is upon the State to prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State's evidence must eliminate all
reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does

not require proof to an absolute certainty.
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women
would have, and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of
evidence

in

possibilities

the

case.

may

create

Depending

upon

a reasonable

the

doubt.

circumstances,
Nevertheless,

reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt that is merely fanciful or
imaginary, or is based upon wholly speculative possibilities.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which
satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it, and eliminates all reasonable
doubt.

A determination that a defendant has committed a crime
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beyond a reasonable doubt demands the application of reason,
impartiality and common sense.
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A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent until
he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The presumption of

innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by the jury at
pleasure but is a substantial, essential part of the law and is
binding upon a jury. This presumption is a humane provision of the
law, intended, so far as human agency is capable, to guard against
the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished.
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in the
minds of the jury unless and until the jury is satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, and, in case of a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an
acquittal.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INSTRUCTION NO.

1 1

Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should reconcile
such conflict as far as you reasonably can. But where the conflict
cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges and must determine
from the evidence what the facts are.

There are no definite rules

governing how you shall determine the weight or convincing force of
any evidence, or how you shall determine what the facts are in this
case.
compare

But you should carefully and conscientiously consider and
all

of

the

testimony,

and

all

of

the

facts

and

circumstances, which have a bearing on any issue, and determine
therefrom what the facts are.

You are not bound to believe all

that the witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of
witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable and convincing in
view of all the facts and circumstances in evidence.

You may

believe one witness as against many, or many as against fewer
number in accordance with your honest convictions.

The testimony

of a witness known to nave made false statements on one matter is
naturally less convincing on other matters, so if you believe a
witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material fact in
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this case, you may disregard the whole of the testimony of such
witness, or you may give it such weight as you think it is
entitled.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence.

In judging the weight of

the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a right to
take into consideration their bias, their interest in the result of
the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly,
if any is shown.

You may consider the witnesses1 deportment upon

the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their
apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity
to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to
remember.

You should consider these matters together with all of

the other facts and circumstances which you may believe have
bearing

on

the

truthfulness

or

accuracy

of

the

witnesses'

statement.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

The

testimony

of some witnesses may be considered with

caution.
For example, a witness who hopes to gain more favorable
treatment in his or her own case may have a reason to make a false
statement because he or she wants to strike a good bargain with the
government.
So, while a witness of that kind may be entirely truthful when
testifying, you may consider that testimony with caution.
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The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion
of a witness to be received as evidence.

An exception to this

rule exists in the case of expert witnesses.

A person who by

education, study, and experience has become an expert in any art,
science or profession, and who is called as a witness, may give
an opinion

as

to

any

such matter

in which

the witness

qualified as an expert and which is material to the case.

is
You

should consider such expert opinion and should weigh the reasons,
if any, given for it.
opinion.

You are not bound, however, by such

You should give it the weight to which you deem it

entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it
if, in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound.
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An important question in this case is the identification of
the

defendant

as

the

person

who

committed

the

crime.

The

prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt,
not

only

defendant

that

the

crime

was

committed,

was the person who committed

but

also

the crime.

that

the

If, after

considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you are
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the
person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not
guilty.
The

identification

testimony

that

you

have

heard

expression of belief or impression by the witness.
defendant

not

guilty,

you

identification witness was not

need

not

believe

was

an

To find the
that

insincere, but merely that

the
the

witness was mistaken in his or her belief or impression.
Many

factors

considering

affect

whether

the

the

accuracy

prosecution

of

identification.

has

proven

beyond

In
a

reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed
the crime, you should consider the following:
1.
the

Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe

criminal

actor?

In

answering

this

question,

you

should

consider:
(a)

the length of time the witness observed the actor;

(b)

the distance between the witness and the actor;

(c)

the light or lack of light at the place and time
of observation

(d)

the presence or absence of distracting noises or
activity during the observation;
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(e)

2.

J

any other circumstance affecting the opportunity
of the witness to observe the person committing
the crime.

Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person

committing

the

crime?

In

answering

this

question,

you

should

consider whether the capacity of the witness was impaired by:

3.

(a)

stress or fright at the time of observation;

(b)

personal motivations, biases or prejudices;

(c)

fatigue or injury.

Whether

criminal actor.

the

witness

is of

a

different

race

than

Identification by a person of a different

the
race

may be less reliable than identification by a person of the same
race.
4.

Was the identification of the defendant by the witness

completely the product of the witness' own memory?

In answering

this question, you should consider:
(a)

the
length
of
time
that
passed
between
the
original
observation
of
the
witness
and
the
identification of the defendant by the witness;

(b)

the mental capacity and state of mind of
witness at the time of the identification:

(c)

the exposure of the witness to opinions,
to
photographs,
or
to any
other
information
or
influence that may have affected the independence
of the identification of the defendant by the
witness;

(d)

any instance when the witness
the defendant;

(e)

any instances when the witness gave a description
of
the
actor
that
is
inconsistent
with
the
defendant's appearance;

(f)

the circumstances under which the defendant
presented to the witness for identification.

failed
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You may also take into account that identifications made from
seeing the person are generally more reliable than identifications
made from a photograph.
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You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness
in his/her own behalf and has the right to go upon the witness
stand and testify if defendant chooses to do so. However, the law
expressly provides that no presumption adverse to defendant is to
arise from the mere fact that defendant does not take the witness
stand.

If defendant is satisfied with the evidence which has been

given, there is no occasion for defendant to add thereto.
So, in this case the mere fact that this defendant has not
testified should not prejudice defendant in any way.

It should not

be considered as any indication either of defendant's guilt or
innocence.
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Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in courts
of justice, upon either or both of which, juries lawfully

may base

their findings, whether favorable to the State or to the defendant,
provided,

however, that

to support

a verdict

of guilt, the

evidence, whether of one kind or the other or a combination of
both, must carry the convincing quality required by law.
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as
circumstantial.

The law makes no distinction between the two

classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to
their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for
such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a
reasonable method of proof.
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at the time in question
is the testimony of every witness who, with any of their own
physical senses, perceived such conduct or any part thereof, and
which testimony describes or relates what thus was perceived.

All

other evidence admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation
to such conduct, and, insofar as it shows any act, statement or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove by
reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, it
may be considered by you in arriving at a verdict.
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To constitute the crime charged in the information there
must be the joint operation of two essential elements:

conduct

prohibited by law and the appropriate culpable mental state or
states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law.
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the
evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was

prohibited

from

committing

the

conduct

charged

in

the

information and that the defendant committed such conduct with
the culpable mental state required for such offense.
"Conduct" means an act or omission.
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty
to act and the actor is capable of acting.
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Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of the offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
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The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind
and connotes a purpose in so acting.

Intent, being a state of

mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive
evidence and may ordinarily be

inferred

from acts, conduct,

statements and circumstances.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INSTRUCTION NO.

<3, \

Intent and motive should never be confused.
prompts a person to act, or fail to act.

Motive is what

Intent refers only to

the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted.
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not
be proven.

The motive of an accused is immaterial except insofar

as evidence of motive may aid in your determination of state of
mind or intent.
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Although there is more than one person who is named in this
action,

the

case

against

each person

independent of the case of the other.

is

separate

from

and

In this action the only

defendant on trial is Michael Pierson.
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A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the
information.

Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it

should be considered separately,

The fact that you may find the

accused guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged
should not control your verdict c s to any other offense charged.
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Before you can convict the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson,
of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder as charged in Count
I of the Information, you must find from all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following
elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah;
2.

The defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, as a party to the

offense;
3.

Was engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or

immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of
aggravated burglary; and
4.

Unlawfully caused the death of Donald Dobson.

If the evidence establishes each of the foregoing elements,
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of
Criminal

Homicide,

Information.

Murder

as

charged

in

Count

I

of

the

If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond

a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements,
then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count I.
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The defendant will have caused the death of another if the
death is caused by anyone while this defendant, either directly
or as

a party

to the

offfense, engages

in the commission,

attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or
attempted commission of aggravated burglary.
The State need not prove that any party to the aggravated
burglary intended to kill another.
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"On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or
is near the day alleged in the information.
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Before you can convict the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson,
of the offense of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count II of
the

information, you must

find

from

all

of

the

evidence

and

beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following
elements of that offense:
1.
Salt

That on or about

Lake County,

State

the 27th day of January,

1997, in

of Utah, the defendant, Michael

Pierson, entered or remained

Paul

in the building of Jared Bowers;

and
2.

That the defendant entered or remained unlawfully; and

3.

That the defendant

entered or remained

intentionally

or knowingly; and
4.

That the defendant entered or remained with the intent

to commit a theft; and
5.
burglary,

That
the

in

attempting,

defendant

or

committing

another

or

fleeing

participant

in

from

the

a

crime

either:
(a)

caused bodily injury to any person who was

not a participant in the crime; or
(b)

used or

dangerous

weapon

threatened
against

any

the

immediate

person

who

use of a
is

not

a

participant in the crime; or
(c)

possessed or attempted to use any explosive

or dangerous weapon.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
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of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Burglary as charged
in count II of the information.

If, on the other hand, you are

not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of
the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not
guilty of count II.
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Under the law of the State of Utah, a person

is guilty

of

Burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any
portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
A person is guilty of Aggravated Burglary if in attempting,
committing,

or

fleeing

from

a

burglary

the

actor

or

another

participant in the crime:
(a)

causes

bodily

injury

to

any

person

who

is

not

a

participant in the crime;
(b)

uses

or

threatens

the

immediate

use

of

a

dangerous

weapon against any person who is not a participant in the crime;
or
(c)

possesses

or

attempts

to

use

any

dangerous weapon.
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person

"enters

or

remains

QL^
unlawfully"

in or

upon

the

premises when the premises or any portion thereof at the time of
the entry or remaining are not open to the public and when the
actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain
on the premises or such portion thereof.
"Building," in addition to it ordinary meaning, means any
watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure
or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for
carrying on business therein and includes:
(a)

Each

separately

secured

or

occupied

portion

of

the

structure or vehicle; and
(b)

Each

structure

appurtenant

to or connected

with the

structure or vehicle.
"Enter"

means

intrusion

of

any

part

of

the

body

or

intrusion of any physical object under the control of the actor.
"Unlawful or unlawfully"

means

that which is contrary to

law or unauthorized by law, or, without legal justification, or,
illegal.
A "Participant" is a person who could be charged as a party
to the crime and does not include the victim of the crime or the
person against whom the crime is committed.
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When a person unlawfully enters a building with the intent
to

commit

a theft, the

crime

of burglary

is committed

and

successful completion of the intended theft need not be shown.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that a firearm is a dangerous weapon.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INSTRUCTION NO.

3cK

Before you can convict the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson,
of the offense of Aggravated Kidnapping as charged in count III
of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following
elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Michael Paul
Pierson, did by any means and in any manner, seize, confine,
detain, or transport Neyna Davis; and
2.

That

such

seizure,

confinement,

detention,

or

transportation was done intentionally or knowingly; and
3.

That

such

seizure,

confinement,

detention,

or

transportation was against the will of Neyna Davis, and without
authority of law; and
4.

That

such

seizure,

confinement,

detention,

or

transportation was committed with the intent to hold Neyna Davis
for ransom or reward; or to hold Neyna Davis as a shield or
hostage; or to facilitate the commission, attempted commission,
or flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony;
or to inflict bodily injury to Neyna Davis.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must

find

the

defendant

guilty

of

Aggravated

charged in count III of the information.

Kidnapping

as

If, on the other hand,

you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or
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more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant
not guilty of count III.
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Under

the

law

of

the

State

3 3
of

Utah,

a

person

commits

Aggravated Kidnapping if that person intentionally or knowingly,
without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by
any

means

and

in

any

manner

seizes,

confines,

detains,

or

transports the victim with intent:
(a)

To

hold

for

ransom

or

reward,

or

as

hostage, or to compel a third person to engage

a

shield

or

in particular

conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular conduct; or
(b)

to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or

flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c)

to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim

or another.
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A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent
or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the
existing

circumstances.

A

person

acts

knowingly,

or

with

knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware

that

his

conduct

is

reasonably

certain

result.
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You are instructed that Aggravated burglary is a felony.
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The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after
the commission of a crime or after that person is accused of a
crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to
establish

the

defendant's

guilt.

However,

such

flight, if

proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proven
facts in the case in determining guilt or innocence.
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred from flight,
it

does

not

necessarily

reflect

actual

guilt

of

the

crime

charged, and there may be reasons for flight fully consistent
with innocence.

Therefore, whether or not evidence of flight

shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to
be attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively within
the province of the jury.
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You are instructed that the parties have stipulated and agreed, and you must accept as true
facts each and all of the following:
1.

Police recovered the guns alleged to have been involved in this case in a pond.

2.

Jeff Burgener showed the police where the guns were.

3.

The two recovered guns were cut up by Jeff Burgener and Benny Gardner.

4.

The guns were taken to the State Crime Laboratory for testing.

5.

Testing revealed that the 9mm casing found at the scene of the crime was fired
from the pistol alleged to have been used by Michael Pierson.

6.

Bulletfragmentsfound in the wound path of Donald Dobson were comparable to
beingfiredfroma revolver alleged to have been used by Clint Hartley.

7.

The 9mm pistol alleged to have been used by Michael Pierson was excluded as
havingfiredthe bullet fragments recovered in the wound path.

8.

The 9mm pistol allegedly used by Jeff Burgener was excluded as havingfiredthe
bulletfragmentsrecovered in the wound path.
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1

In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment, as that is a
matter which lies with the Court and other governmental agencies,
and must not in any way affect your decision as to the guilt or
innocence of a defendant.
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When you retire to consider your verdicts, you will select one
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will
preside over your deliberations.
Your verdicts in this case must be either:
Guilty of CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a First Degree Felony, as
charged in Count I of the Information;
or
Not Guilty of Count I, CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a First
Degree Felony;
And/or
Guilty of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, as
charged in Count II of the Information;
or
Not Guilty of Count II, AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree
Felony;
And/or
Guilty of AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, as
charged in Count III of the Information;
or
Not Guilty of Count III, AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree
Felony;
as your deliberations may determine.
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all
jurors is required to find a verdict.
writing, and when

found, must be

Your verdicts must be in

signed

and

foreperson and then returned by you to this court.
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verdicts have been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to
report to the court.
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ADDENDUM D
(Presentence Report)
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PRIVATE
STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
REGION III OFFICE
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 239-2103

PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
Date Due: 09-30-98
Sentencing Date: 10-05-98
JUDGE SANDRA PEULER THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE
(CITY)

SALT LAKE
(COUNTY)

UTAH

C. TODD ORGILL CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR

NAME: PIERSON, MICHAEL PAUL
ALIASES: MIKE PIERSON
ADDRESS: SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL
SLC, UTAH 84111
BIRTHDATE: 06-02-77 AGE: 21

BIRTHPLACE: TUCSON, AZ
LEGAL RESIDENCE: UTAH
MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE

COURT CASE NO: 971004133
OBSCIS NO: 00131400
CO-DEFENDANTS: CLINT R. HARTLEY;
JEFFERY RAY BURGENER; MELISA PARKER
OFFENSE: CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, FIRST
DEGREE FELONY; AGGRAVATED BURGLARY,
FIRST DEGREE FELONY; AGGRAVATED
KIDNAPPING, FIRST DEGREE FELONY W/ GANG
AND FIREARM ENHANCEMENTS
PLEA: CONVICTED DATE: 08-28-98
PROS. ATTORNEY: VINCE MEISTER
DEF. ATTORNEY: PATRICK ANDERSON
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
PIERSON, MICHAEL PAUL

PLEA BARGAIN:
The defendant was originally charged with Count One, Criminal Homicide, Murder, First Degree
Felony; Count Two, Aggravated Burglar}7, First Degree Felony; and Count Three, Aggravated
Kidnapping, First Degree Felony. All of these charges were subject to enhancedfirearmsand
gang penalties because the offenses were committed with a firearm, and in concert with two or
more people. On August 28, 1998, the defendant was convicted as charged via a jury trial.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Court dockets and District Attorney file
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE:
On 1/27/97, at 1950 hours, West Valley City Police Department Officer Vanroosendaal arrived
at 6515 West 3880 South at 2000 hours. At that moment, he saw several people standing in the
road. One male ran toward his patrol car, yelling, "You've got to help me, help him!"
Officer Vanroosendaal then asked where the victim was. The male pointed to 6543 West 3880
South. Officer Vanroosendaal then asked where were the suspects. Several people yelled,
"They're gone. They left in a white car." This was done as Officer Vanroosendaal was running
toward 6543 West 3880 South, the victim's location.
Officer Vanroosendaal ran through the yard and into the driveway of 6543 West 3880 South and
gave dispatch his exact location. Officer Vanroosendaal entered the residence through the west
door. He walked through the kitchen and then left into the living room (north). Lying on the
ground was a white male (later identified as Donald Dobson) in a brownish shirt. The male was
lying on his back, head pointed north, feet pointed south. The white male's eyes were closed and
there was a large puddle of blood on the sides of and underneath his head. There was a large
wound on the right side of the white male's head with bone and brain matter visible. There was
also brain material underneath and on the left side of the victim's head. The victim was gurgling
but breathing short quick breaths. Officer Vanroosendaal checked the carotid pulse of the victim.
It was present but not regular or strong. Officer Vanroosendaal continued to monitor the victim's
respiration and pulse, yelling to him to hang on.
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
PIERSON, MICHAEL PAUL

OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE. (Continued)
There were several people in the living room sitting on the black leather sofa on the north wall
and a couple were standing. Officer Vanroosendaal asked that anyone "who didn't need to be
there" leave. He also noticed blood on the north wall of the living room, the north door in the
living room and on the black leather sofa that people had been sitting on.
Medical began to arrive at about 2005 hours. Officer Vanroosendaal assisted as Officer Monson
also assisted and took pictures of the scene. Medical requested Life Flight. Officer
Vanroosendaal then advised dispatch to call for Life Flight and set up a landing zone with
another officer as soon as possible.
After medical left the scene, Officer Vanroosendaal began looking for bullet casings or bullets.
He found a bullet, copper in color, with two silver fragments near it by the north wall of the
kitchen. Officer Vanroosendaal also observed blood on the same wall above the paneling. He
then observed blood on the north stairway wall. Officer Vanroosendaal covered the bullet
fragments and bullet with glasses and a pitcher from the floor of the kitchen. He then waited for
evidence detectives to arrive. Upon their arrival, he left the house.
Officer Vanroosendaal then spoke to Jarred Bowers, a witness. Jarred stated that approximately
10 minutes prior to his arrival, he was in the kitchen of 6543 West 3880 South with several
friends and the victim, Donald Wayne Dobson. Donald was the white male gunshot victim
found at 6543 West 3880 South. Jarred stated that someone knocked on the west door of the
residence. Jarred answered the door. A 16-18 year old female, approximately 5'0", blonde hair
in a ponytail with a black sweater and light colored Levi's asked, "Is Nick here?" Immediately
after her question, Jarred stated that a white male with a black hat, pulled down to cover his face,
a black bandana tied around his face from his nose down, a black Atlanta Falcons T-shirt jersey
#21 (Deion Sanders) with red and white trim and Levi's, entered the doorway from the north and
put a gun to Jarred's head. Jarred believed the gun to be a black semi-auto type. As the male
suspect was putting the gun to Jarred's head, Jarred pushed the male suspect's arm away. A shot
went off near Jarred's head. As Jarred pushed the suspect's arm, the suspect went backwards.
Jarred then ran out of the house over the white female and into three males walking up the
driveway. The three males were wearing black and red bandanas covering the lower half of their
faces. The three males attempted to stop Jarred with their hands and arms. Jarred put his arms
up and ran through them to his friend's house on 6515 West at about 3885 South, and called the
police. As Jarred was running, he heard at least two gunshots.
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OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (Continued)
At approximately 2330 hours, Officer Vanroosendaal was contacted by Mr. Scott Dobson, the
victim's father. Scott advised that his son, Donald, had died at LDS Hospital. Officer
Vanroosendaal then referred the case to Detective Bob Day who arrived on the scene and
continued the investigation.
Detective Day began interviewing witnesses, who identified the possible suspect as Nathan
Curtis Hicks and David Alexander. Witnesses stated these suspects had an "an ongoing feud
with the victim." Detective Day spoke to Nathan Hicks, who stated he was not involved in the
robbery or murder, but suspected a person named "P-Dog," later identified as Michael Pierson,
was responsible. Nathan Hicks stated he was home at the time of the robbery and learned of the
shooting when the helicopter landed on their street. Detective Day then interviewed David
Alexander, who also denied any involvement in the offense and stated he was home with his
family when the robbery occurred.
On 1/29/97, Detective Day received an anonymous phone call from a confidential informant who
stated two hours prior to the shooting, he received a phone call from Michael Pierson. Mr.
Pierson is a member of the "Kearns Town Bloods" and the C.I. stated Pierson and the KTB had
been involved in several drug related robberies during the past year. The C.I. told Detective Day
that during his phone call with Michael Pierson on the night of the shooting, Mr. Pierson said he
was going to "jack" or rob, the victim and send a female to the door first. Mr. Pierson told him,
"I'm grabbing the first mother-fucker at the door. If he gets crazy, I'll kill him." The
conversation also included some reference to the victim having "scored some drugs." The C.I.
advised that after the incident, he received a phone call from David Alexander, who had learned
about the shooting from Jeremy Brinkerhoff, a neighbor who lived near the victim. The C.I. told
Detective Day he knew Pierson and a second party known s "K-Dog," later identified as Clint
Hartley, arrived at the home of "Pokey," or Klynt Barber, after the shooting and asked him to
drive them away from the area. The C.I. stated a person named "Skelly," later identified as
Jeffrey Burgener, drove a white Eagle Talon, the same style of car as the suspect car. The C.I.
advised Michael Pierson had a girlfriend named Jennifer Elliott.
Detective Day interviewed Ms. Elliott, who advised Michael Pierson told her he had gone to a
"place to rob someone," a person had come at him and he was shot by one of Mike's friends.
Mike told Ms. Elliott he was armed, but he did not shoot anyone. Ms. Elliott stated she spoke to
Mike's sister, Monica Pierson, who told her there was a female involved in the robbery named
Melisa Parker.
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OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (Continued)
On 2/11/97, Melisa Parker was advised of her Miranda rights. She denied personal culpability
or knowledge of the crime, and requested an attorney. On 3/5/97, Ms. Parker was re-interviewed
and admitted to her involvement in the robbery. She provided detectives with important
information about the circumstances and details of the offense. Ms. Parker related she was
contacted by Michael Pierson four hours prior to the robbery, advising her of the plan, and
requesting her assistance. Pierson told her the target had 40 pounds of marijuana and she would
receive 10 pounds for her services. Ms. Parker stated she, Michael Pierson, Jeff Burgener, and
Clint Hartley rehearsed the plan before committing the robbery. Ms. Parker recalled she heard
two shots fired and then went into the house and saw the victim laying on the floor. She stated
Michael Pierson told her the following day he and Clint Hartley fired at the same time. Ms.
Parker was released after the interview.
On 2/6/97, Detective Vince Garcia received a phone call from Michael Pierson, who asked if he
could come in and talk with detectives about the case. He told Detective Garcia he had heard the
police were looking for him. Mr. Pierson arrived at the station and an interview was conducted.
Mr. Pierson was advised of his Miranda rights. He denied personal culpability or knowledge of
the robbery and said David Alexander and Nathan Hicks were likely responsible for the crime.
Mr. Pierson related he had been involved with "drug rip-offs" several years ago, but had not
engaged in that behavior for some time. Mr. Pierson claimed the information alleging his
involvement in the robbery was a mistake. He said, "You don't have a gun, fingerprints, or GSR,
so we don't have a case."
On 2/12/97, Detectives Day and Garcia interviewed Clint Hartley. He was offered his Miranda
regarding the case. Clint Hartley denied knowing Michael Pierson. He denied any knowledge or
involvement in the robbery. Detective Day asked Clint Hartley if he would submit to a
polygraph test. Mr. Hartley became visibly nervous, his face twitched, and his voice cracked.
The interview was concluded. It is noted that Mr. Hartley, on 1/23/98, during a Preliminary
Hearing, fully confessed his involvement in the offense and provided important information
leading to the resolution of the case.
It was later determined Parker, Burgener, Hartley, and Pierson, entered the house with the intent
to commit a theft. Burgener, Hartley, and Pierson, were each in possession of a handgun that
was displayed at the time of the entry into the house. Upon entry, defendants Pierson and
Hartley both fired their hand guns. The victim, Donald Dobson was struck once in the head by
what was later determined to be a 9mm caliber bullet.
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OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (Continued)
After Dobson was shot, defendant Pierson put his hand gun to the head of Neyna Davis and
escorted her to the basement of the house, demanding that she tell him where all the drugs in the
house were located.
On 3/7/97, Detective Day screened the case with the District Attorney's Office. On 3/10/97,
warrants were issued for the arrests of Michael Pierson, Ray Burgener, Clint Hartley, and Melisa
Parker. On 3/11/97, all suspects were arrested and booked into the Salt Lake County Jail.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
West Valley City Police Department report #97-004946.
DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE:
On Monday, September 21, 1998, this investigator interviewed the defendant at the Salt Lake
County Jail. At the time of the interview, it was noted the defendant did not receive a
presentence investigation packet, and as a result, did not have the opportunity to submit his
version of the current crime. Mr. Pierson was advised this investigator would return on Monday,
September 28, 1998, to obtain his written statement. Upon returning to the Salt Lake County Jail
on September 28,1998, the defendant stated he had not completed his version of the crime
because he believed sentencing was going to be continued to an unspecified date. As a result, the
defendant's version pertaining to the current crime was not available.
It must be noted that Mr. Pierson verbally denied being involved in any aspect of the current
crime. Mr. Pierson surmised the murder was committed by Nathan Hicks and David Alexander.
He denied ever being present during the commitment of any homicide, and stated he has not been
involved in a home invasion robbery for at least 4 years.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
CO-DEFENDANT STATUS:
Clint Hartley, was originally charged with Murder, a First Degree Felony, and Aggravated
Burglary, a First Degree Felony (971004134). Through plea negotiations, Mr. Hartley pled
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PAGE 7
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
PIERSON, MICHAEL PAUL

CO-DEFENDANT STATUS: (continued)
guilty to amended charges of Criminal Homicide, a Second Degree Felony, to include both gun
and gang enhancements, and Burglary, a Second Degree Felony on April 23, 1998. On July 23,
1998, Mr. Hartley was sentenced to the Utah State Prison. Count One, Manslaughter, Second
Degree Felony, was to run consecutive with the gang enhancement, firearm enhancement, and
Count Two, Burglary, Second Degree Felony. Mr. Hartley was ordered to pay a $2,500 fine,
$4,000 restitution jointly and severally, and pay a $500 recoupment fee.
Jeffrey Ray Burgener was originally charged with Murder, First Degree Felony and Aggravated
Burglary, First Degree Felony (971004135). A jury trial is scheduled for December 8, 1998,
before Your Honor. S G W N V ^ *V 1A
Melisa Parker was originally charged with Murder, First Degree Felony and Aggravated
Burglary, First Degree Felony (971004132). A review hearing is scheduled for September 30,
1998.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Court dockets and District Attorney file
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT:
Debora Latner, Donald Dobson's mother, returned the Victim Impact Statement. She wrote,
"My son was murdered." Ms. Latner indicated the impact of the crime has been devastating to
her family and they continue to experience all the emotions associated with the grieving process.
In regards to restitution, she indicated, "I do not want to be reimbursed for anything. No amount
of money will help me and I do not want to profit from my son's death." Ms. Latner agreed with
the outcome of the case and wrote regarding the co-defendant, "Clint Hartley has been very
cooperative during the past year, but he could still get the same as the other murderers life with
no parole." With regards to sentencing, Ms. Latner wrote, "I would like to see life with no
parole- for my son's life they gets no second chance. Why should they? They have to pay for
their mistakes and may never be able to live among anyone."
This investigator subsequently contacted Ms. Latner by telephone. She advised this investigator
that since her son was murdered, she is "afraid of young kids", and is skeptical of everyone. She
acknowledged she "still cries a lot", and continues to grieve everyday. At the time of his death,
Ms. Latner stated her son had just turned 21 years of age. Ms. Latner advised this investigator
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VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: (continued)
she believes the defendant should receive the maximum sentence permitted by law.
Contact was made with Scott Dobson, the victim's father, who stated the tragic loss of his son's
life has been devastating for him and his family. He related his family has always been close and
this has been an extremely difficult situation for them. Family members continue to experience
difficulties with their grief and the loss of a loved one, especially under such tragic
circumstances. Mr. Dobson said, "An innocent man's life was taken too soon, and for no
reason." During the course of the Court hearings, Mr. Dobson stated the defendant was very
snide, and expressed absolutely no remorse. Further, Mr. Dobson stated one of the defendant's
cohorts threatened his (Dobson's) nephew. With regards to sentencing, Mr. Dobson
recommended the defendant and co-defendants be committed to prison, without the possibility of
parole. He considers the defendant and co-defendants to be very dangerous individuals who
must be kept out of society or else they will kill again. Mr. Dobson asked the Court impose the
maximum sentence so that there will be no more victims.
This investigator was unable to establish contact with Neyna Davis or Jarred Bowers prior to the
date of dictation. The home telephone numbers for Ms. Davis and Mr. Bowers have been
disconnected. Officials of American Air Duct Cleaning stated Ms. Davis quit approximately 3 to
4 months ago.
Joanne Zaharias, LCSW of the District Attorney Victim Counseling Unit, stated she initially met
with Neyna Davis in April 1997. During this initial meeting, she noted Ms. Davis was having
flashbacks and was afraid of retaliation. Thereafter, Ms. Zaharias stated Ms. Davis did not
follow through with ongoing therapy. Ms. Zaharias noted that although she has not had an
extensive amount of contact with Ms. Davis, she acknowledged Ms. Davis has continued to have
a struggle maintaining jobs, and a permanent resident. Ms. Zaharias indicated she is not sure if
her living and employment instability can be attributed to the current case. Ms. Zaharias noted
her contact with Ms. Davis has been quite superficial. Ms. Zaharias did not have any updated
information on how Ms. Davis could be contacted.
Ms. Zaharias stated her only contact with Jarred Bowers has been prior to Court hearings. She
noted the contact has been quite minimal. Ms. Zaharias did not have any updated information on
how Mr. Bowers could be contacted.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Statements of Debora Latner and Scott Dobson, the victim's parents.
RESTITUTION:
COURT CASE #

COUNT #

VICTIM

AMOUNT

971004133

I (fell

Donald Dobson (Funeral Costs,
Crime Victim Reparations)

$

971004133

III

Neyna Davis

Unknown (Unable to
establish contact)

971004133

N/A

Jarred Bowers

Unknown (Unable to
establish contact)

4,000.00

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Office of Crime Victim Reparation, CVRNo.107147.
CUSTODY STATUS
The defendant was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on March 12, 1997, and has remained
incarcerated as of the date of dictation. Therefore, as of the October 5,1998, sentencing date,
Mr. Pierson has served 572 days for the current crime.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Documentation provided by the Salt Lake County Jail

LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT:
Detective Bob Day of the West Valley City Police Department stated the defendant is a
"psychopath." Detective Day stated the current case involving a homicide and home invasion
robbery was "the tip of the iceberg." Detective Day indicated Mr. Pierson is a "violent, serial
offender" who is suspected of participating in 60 to 80 home invasion robberies, and being
present at several other homicides. He acknowledged the defendant is "big-time gang banger"
who has been active since he was 11 to 12 years old. Since being incarcerated, Detective Day
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LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: (continued)
stated the defendant has been threatening individuals, and "placing contracts" on people's lives
to deter them from testifying. Detective Day stated the defendant has been extremely
uncooperative, and has not assumed any culpability for his criminal actions. He indicated Mr.
Pierson is a "full-time criminal" that is a "sociopath predator." Detective Day stated the
defendant poses an extreme threat to the general society. He adamantly recommended the
defendant have all charges and enhancements run consecutively.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Contact with Detective Bob Day of the West Valley City Police Department
JUVENILE RECORD:
DATE

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

09-16-91

Propelling Object at Vehicle

Petition filed, dismissed

Assault

Petition filed, dismissed

Burglary of Vehicle

Petition filed, YC Observation &
Assessment

Burglary of Vehicle

Petition filed, YC Observation &
Assessment

Burglary of Vehicle

Petition filed, dismissed

Burglary of Vehicle

Petition filed, YC Observation &
Assessment

Theft, $299 or Less, Class
B Misd.

Petition filed, dismissed

Dest. of Property Under $250

Petition filed, dismissed

02-13-93
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JUVENILE RECORD: (continued)
DATE

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

04-09-93

Theft, $5,000 or >, Second
Degree Felony

Insufficient facts to justify

08-18-93

Alcohol Poss. / Consumption

Petition filed, YC Observation &
Assessment

False ID- Name, DOB

Petition filed, dismissed

Exhibiting a Dangerous Wpn.

Review hearing set, YC Observation
& Assessment

Shooting in Restricted Area

Petition filed, YC Observation &
Assessment

11-01-93

Detention Hearing

Hold in Detention

11-15-93

Review

Review hearing set, Youth
Corrections community program,
attend school, counseling ordered,
other administrative action

02-15-94

Review

Review hearing set, fined

Review

Review hearing set, previous order
continued, other administrative
action

05-05-94

Contempt, Non-Pecuniary Crt.
Order

Petition filed, previous order
continued, work hours ordered, other
administrative action

05-11-94

Detention Hearing

Hold in detention

10-30-93
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JUVENILE RECORD: (continued)
DATE

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

06-11-94

Contempt, Non-Pecuniary

Petition filed, Youth Corrections
secure facility

06-22-94

Robbery, Second Degree Felony

Petition filed, Youth Corrections
secure facility

06-24-94

Detention Hearing

Hold in detention

04-06-95

Parole

Youth Corrections Parole Authority

08-30-95

Discharged from YC Jurisdiction

Discharged

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Utah State Juvenile Court records (case no. 816254)
ADULT RECORD:
DATE
AGENCY

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

06-20-96

SO SL Co., UT

Theft, Misd.

Convicted, 30 days jail, fined $150
(963002835, S.L. Co. Justice Court)

03-12-97

PD WVC, UT

WA Criminal Homicide;
WA Agg. Burglary;
WA Agg. Kidnapping;

CURRENT OFFENSE

WA Homicide / Art.
Homicide

Pending (See Pending Cases Section)

BW Theft;
BWFTA

Convicted of both offenses on 0820-96, $250 fine, 30 days jail,
counseling with Intermountain
Substance Abuse (963003263, S.L.
Co. Justice Court)
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office rap sheet (SO# 0218360), Utah Criminal History record (SID#
456268), FBI rap sheet (FBI# 335208EB9), Court dockets, and contact with officials of the Salt
Lake County Justice Court
PENDING CASES:
On August 14, 1997, a case was filed in Third District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah charging the
defendant with Murder, First Degree Felony and Attempted Murder, Second Degree Felony (See
03-12-97 arrest date, Court case no. 971015106). A 5 day jury trial is scheduled for November
2, 1998, before the Honorable Frank Noel.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Court dockets
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY:
The defendant does not possess a history of supervised probation in the state of Utah as an adult.
Pat Taylor, the defendant's former parole officer, is no longer employed by Youth Corrections.
As a result, this investigator was unable to obtain any information pertaining to the defendant's
performance while on Youth Parole.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.
Records of the Utah State Department of Corrections and Contact with officials of Youth
Corrections
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION:
Michael Paul Pierson was born in Tucson, Arizona on June 2, 1977. The defendant, and his
younger sister were raised primarily by their father, as when he was 2 years old, his mother left
the family. Thereafter, he and his younger sister, were raised primarily by his father and
grandmother. Per the defendant, he had no contact with his mother during his youth.
The defendant described his youth as "blessed." Mr. Pierson indicated he "loved" his youth, and
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BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: (continued)
his family were very close. In regards to problems, the defendant acknowledged his father was,
at times, verbally abusive. Mr. Pierson attributed this verbal abuse to the fact his father was
young, stressed, and did not know how to raise children. According to the defendant, his
grandmother was essentially a mother figure for him. Mr. Pierson stated during his youth his
father was employed as an engineer for Bectal Engineering, a mining engineering company. The
defendant stated his family did not have any problems with drugs or alcohol.
When the defendant was 11, he, his father, and sister, moved to Reno, Nevada. They remained in
Reno for 3 years, and then relocated to Elko, Nevada. After living in Elko for 2 years they
moved to the Salt Lake City area where they have remained for the last 5 years. After the present
crime occurred, Mr. Pierson stated his father moved to Houston, Texas because of continued
threats which were being made against them. His father believes Mr. Pierson did not commit the
current crime.
Currently, the defendant is incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
MARITAL HISTORY:
The defendant denied ever being married, and did not claim legal orfinancialresponsibility for
any children.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
EDUCATION:
The defendant withdrew from Hunter Junior High School located in Magna, Utah during the
ninth grade. Per the defendant, he withdrew from school prematurely because of a conflict he
had with his basketball coach. The defendant has not obtained any additional education. He
expressed a desire to pursue "as much education" as he can in the future.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
GANG AFFILIATIONS:
The defendant is an active member of the King Mafia Disciples. His moniker is "Cocaine."
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Salt Lake City Gang Area Project records
PHYSICAL HEALTH:
The defendant described his physical health as "great." Per the defendant, during the latter part
of 1996, he "blew out" his left knee, and damaged his ACL. Mr. Pierson had surgery performed
on his knee to repair the damage. He is not ingesting any prescription medication at the current
time.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
MENTAL HEALTH:
The defendant stated his emotional health is "good as can be expected." He denied ever being
referred to a psychologist, psychiatrist, or a mental health facility for emotional problems. He
has never ingested medications for psychiatric difficulties. The defendant did not express a
desire to receive mental health counseling at the present time. He has never considered suicide,
nor has he ever been physically or sexually abused in the past.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
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ALCOHOL HISTORY:
The defendant initially began using alcohol when he was 17 years old. Mr. Pierson denied ever
abusing the use of alcohol. He could recall three times in which he has become intoxicated from
using alcohol. Mr. Pierson stated his use of alcohol is very infrequent. He has never received
any alcohol abuse treatment, and did not express a desire for such a therapeutic measure at the
current time.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
DRUG HISTORY:
The defendant first used marijuana when he was 17 years old. For one year thereafter, he used
the substance approximately once per week. Since the age of 18, his usage of marijuana has been
minimal. He denied using any other drugs, and stated he has never received any drug abuse
treatment. Mr. Pierson did not express a desire to receive drug therapy at the current time.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
The defendant's Social Security Number is 527-97-1245
The defendant did not provide this investigator with an itemized listing of his previous
employment experiences. However, he verbally advised this investigator he has primarily been
employed doing body work, and welding.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
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FINANCIAL SITUATION:
The defendant is not earning an income at the present time. He has no monthly expenses, debts,
or assets.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
MILITARY RECORD:
The defendant has never been a member of the United States Armed Forces.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
COLLATERAL CONTACTS.
Vince Meister, the assigned prosecutor to the current case, recommended all charges and
enhancements run consecutive for a sentence of 61-Life if the defendant does not cooperate. Mr.
Meister noted that if Mr. Pierson cooperates on other criminal matters, he receive a sentence of
either 28-Life or 38-Life.
Julie Holbrook, LCSW of the District Attorney Victim Counseling Unit, stated the death of
Donald Dobson has had a devastating effect on his entire family. Ms. Holbrook stated, although
she has not had ongoing counseling with the family, she stated she has had frequent contact with
them during Court hearings. Although she did not want to speak on behalf of the family, Ms.
Holbrook surmised the family wants the defendant and co-defendant's to receive the most severe
punishment possible.
Michael Pierson, the defendant's father, verified the information presented in the background,
marital, education, physical, alcohol, drugs, and military sections of this report. Mr. Pierson
stated he was forced to leave Salt Lake City after receiving direct threats from Clausing and
Parker. Per Mr. Pierson, he feared for his and his family's lives. Mr. Pierson stated when the
defendant was a child, his mother abandoned him. Thereafter, he was diagnosed with Attention
Deficit Disorder. Mr. Pierson noted his son is "not a murderer", and can be "salvaged." Mr.
Pierson indicated he may submit a written letter on a future date detailing additional information
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS: (continued)
he has regarding the current case. As of the date of dictation, this investigator has not received
any additional information from Mr. Pierson.
Patrick Anderson, the defendant's counsel, stated Mr. Pierson has consistently maintained he was
not involved in the current case. Mr. Anderson noted the bullet which killed Mr. Dobson was
traced to the gun possessed by Clint Hartley. Further, Mr. Anderson indicated the Kidnapping
charge should have been merged with the Burglary charge. He noted Neyna Davis was not tied
up or struck. Mr. Anderson indicated the transporting of Ms. Davis downstairs at gunpoint was
not a typical, heinous kidnapping offense. Mr. Anderson added that according to the testimony
of Neyna Davis, it was Clint Hartley that ordered her downstairs at gunpoint, not the defendant.
Mr. Anderson did not provide this investigator with a specific recommendation pertaining to the
current crime.
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY:
Now appearing before the Court for sentencing on the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder,
First Degree Felony; Aggravated Burglary, First Degree Felony; and Aggravated Kidnapping,
First Degree Felony, is Michael Paul Pierson, a 21 year old male. Utah State Juvenile Court
records revealed the defendant was referred to juvenile authorities 15 times for primarily alcohol,
burglary, theft, and weapons related charges. As an adult, the defendant has been arrested one
prior time, and been convicted of 2 theft related misdemeanors. Mr. Pierson was placed in a
secure facility as a juvenile, and was granted parole one time. Currently, the defendant has a
pending case out of Third District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah in which he was charged with
Murder, First Degree Felony and Attempted Murder, Second Degree Felony (See 03-12-97 arrest
date, Court case no. 971015106). A 5 day jury trial is scheduled for November 2, 1998, before
the Honorable Frank Noel.
The family of the victim in this case has suffered extreme trauma, not only over the death of Mr.
Dobson, but over the brutal and senseless manner of the death. They are requesting the Court
impose the maximum sentence possible, specifically focusing on their desire no other victims or
their families suffer from Mr. Piersons conduct.
The defendant does have family support, but little else to offer in mitigation of his actions. Law
enforcement personnel describe his as a "serial predator."
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: (continued)
In this case, Mr. Pierson participated in the most heinous crime one could commit. His actions fatally
injured Mr. Dobson, and severely threatened others who were present at the residence where the incident
occurred. Mr. Pierson does not assume any culpability for the current crime, and in fact denied even
being present. Due to the egregious nature of the present offense, and the very real danger Mr. Pierson
poses to the general public, this agency absolutely believes the maximum punitive measures should be
imposed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
C. TODD ORGILL, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR

APPROVED,

LTJIERINE SHEPHERDT
ASSISTANT REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR
COURT SERVICES UNIT
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AGENCY RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended by the Staff of Adult Probation and Parole, Court Services, that the
following sentence be imposed.
riminal Homicide, Murder, a First Degree Felony, the defendant be committed for
eottense
five years to life.

V

For the offense of Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony, the defendant be committed for five j )
^ears to Ijft^andfor thg^ffense of Aggravated Kidnaping, a First Degree Felony carrying a minimum
tory tertfTof ^TlOjbr 15 years to lifeline defendant receive the median term of 10 years to life.
It is further recommended that the offenses of Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping be run
concurrently with each other, but consecutively with the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder, a First
Degree Felony.
It is the understanding that the gang enhancements for each first degree felony are 9 years to life it is
recommended the gang enhancements for each charge be imposed consecutively, and similarly that the
apons_^nliancei^ntsj3fU-^vem^ also be impused on cach-eas€4ojQinxonsecutivel5rb The defendant
should alsobe^5f3ered full restitution, jointly and severally with Mr. Clint HaftT

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
C. TODD ORGILL, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR

APPROVED,

iRINE SHEPHERD,
ASSISTANT REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR
COURT SERVICES UNIT
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3. UNUSUAL VICTIM VUNERABIUTY
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.

MONTHS

AGGK^ATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTAlWs
(Use Form 2 For Mandatory Sentence Situations)
1'ircle the numbers of circumstances that may justify departure from the
guidelines. Reference the page number of the presentence investigation where
:he judge can find supportive information.
Aggravating Circumstances
Only use aggravating circumstances if they are not implicit in Che conviction
offense or the calculation of criminal history score.
PS^ Page #
1.
- ^
2.
3.
_•'

if

It.

~7Zr

5.
6.
7.

S

8.
9.
10

Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct.
Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior.
Victim was particularly vulnerable.
Injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive.
Offense was characterized by extreme cruelcy or depravity.
There were multiple charges or victims.
Offender'6 attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less
restrictive setting.
Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest.
Sex Offenses: Correction's formal assessment procedures classify
as an high risk offender.
Other (specify)
Mitigating Circumstances

1.
2.
3.
6..
5.
6.
7<
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened
serious harm.
Offender acted under strong provocation.
There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal
behavior, though failing to establish a defense.
Offender is young.
Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other
crimes.
Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration.
Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision.
Domestic crime victim does not want incarceration.
Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family
relationships.
Imprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender'or
dependents.
Offender has extended period of arrest-free street time.
Other (specify)
PLEASE COMPLETE THIS SHETION

DAYS OF JAIL CREDIT

«J T C

GUIDELINE BF.mMMErcnATTON „
AP&P RECOMMENDATION .

K

M\/S

C ft*

r>r

^

/W<4«r_.

/ *£-($£> ^

REASON FOR DEPARTURE
COMMUNITY DEMAND
SENTENCE ACTUALLY IMPOSED
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
Form OCR,
5 may contain errors.

